JULY 9, 2003

I thank my colleagues, Chairman Upton and Chairman Stearns, for holding this hearing today. I am proud of this Committee’s efforts to combat spam. During the past two Congresses, we reported legislation to protect consumers from the increasing amounts of commercial e-mail that fill their in-boxes. Unfortunately, that legislation has yet to make it to the President’s desk, though I hope this year will be different.

As all of us are only too aware, the amount of spam clogging our information networks has risen several fold since we last considered legislation on this issue. In fact, the volume has increased to such levels that it is degrading the usefulness of e-mail as a quick means of communication. For this reason, the call for action has grown. Indeed, spam legislation now enjoys broad support across the political spectrum, even from the industry groups that once opposed it. I am confident that the resolve of the House to pass strong legislation has increased.

Today we find ourselves examining two bills. The first, H.R. 2515, is a strong bill put forward by two leaders on this issue – Reps. Green and Wilson. I am pleased to join with a bipartisan majority of the Committee who are cosponsors of the Wilson-Green bill. The second, H.R. 2214, was introduced by Rep. Burr, along with Chairmen Tauzin and Sensenbrenner. It is weaker in several important respects. I remain hopeful that the competing bills can be reconciled into one strong bill.

Four criteria tell us whether a compromise bill would provide needed protection for consumers and would prevent network congestion. First, it should afford state attorneys general and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) full enforcement authority over each provision in the bill. The Burr-Tauzin bill fails to do this. It is unnecessary and wholly unprecedented to place arbitrary caps on the damages that state AGs may seek from serial spammers. It is similarly unhelpful to randomly limit the ability of the states to bring actions against spammers once a federal action is complete.

Second, the legislation should apply to all commercial e-mail, and it should not contain the limiting "primary purpose" language that is found in the Burr-Tauzin bill. From a consumer’s perspective, spam is spam, and, in my experience, consumers find no distinction between good spam and bad spam. The Burr-Tauzin bill would create a new category of perfectly legal spam that would be exempt from the opt-out provision and from state regulation. Smart marketers would seize this loophole to create spam that fits within this definition and is exempt from the law.

Third, the bill should also contain strong language protecting consumers, particularly children, from unwanted sexually oriented e-mail. Only the Wilson-Green bill ensures that consumers will not be required to view offensive material before opting out, and that language is critical.

Fourth, the bill should contain a sufficiently broad definition of "affiliate" so that consumers are not required to opt out of each affiliate within a giant corporation. Citigroup, for example, has hundreds of affiliates, and the Burr-Tauzin bill would require a consumer to individually opt out of each affiliate. In contrast, the Wilson-Green bill takes a far more sensible and consumer-friendly approach. Simply stated, if affiliates can share a consumer’s e-mail address, then they can also share that consumer’s request to opt out of future spam.

In crafting a compromise, we must remember that the twin purposes of this bill are to protect consumers from unwanted e-mails and to help unclog our communications networks. A bill that does not provide for strong enforcement or that creates a new category of government-sanctioned spam will not achieve those important purposes.