SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS May 1, 2003 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing to discuss the very significant decision by the Department of Energy (DOE) to competitively bid the contract to operate the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Although we do not have details about how the competition is going to be run, I applaud Secretary Abraham for this decision. Prior Energy Secretaries tried, but failed, to force needed changes short of this step. They did not realize that the University of California was too obstinate, arrogant, and entrenched to make needed changes. The most recent failed DOE effort was Appendix O, which was added to the contract by the University after the Wen Ho Lee and the lost hard drive incidents, and the cost overruns and schedule delays of the National Ignition Facility. These were just the latest in two decades of "chronic security and other management-related problems." On October 26, 2000, then Committee Chairman Tom Bliley and I wrote a letter to then-DOE Secretary Bill Richardson after he had decided to extend the UC contract for another three years. We knew then that the promises made by the University in Appendix O, which included a new vice president for laboratory management, would not work, and we asked the Secretary to compete or renegotiate the contract. As we stated: (October 26, 2000, letter from Reps. Tom Bliley and John Dingell to Secretary Bill Richardson, p. 2. (emphasis added)) In July of 2000, Dr. John McTague, who became the Universitys vice president for laboratory management, had written to Secretary Richardson proposing this position for a person who would "assess and assure the performance of the laboratory directors, as well as technical excellence of programs, major project management, personnel systems, safety, security, and business practices." Dr. McTague said the UC oversight role of the laboratories was "poorly defined and inadequately manned." (July 16, 2000, letter from Dr. John McTague to Secretary Bill Richardson, p. 2.) Dr. McTague got that job, but promptly used it to negotiate FY 2003 performance standards for the laboratory that elevated scientific tasks and denigrated even further the value placed on adequate security, safety, environment, financial controls, and business practices. These standards were adopted lock, stock, and barrel by the Department barely a month ago after the procurement scandal had broken, after the broken property management system was identified, after Messrs. Walp and Doran were fired in just the latest maltreatment of whistleblowers and problem-raisers, after the lab director and more than a dozen other people were removed from their jobs, and after the audit function at Los Alamos was taken over by the Universitys auditor. Yesterday, Ambassador Brooks claimed that these standards were negotiated before any of this happened although the University did not sign off on the implementation plan until April 13 and that perhaps they would have to be renegotiated to reflect current events. There is a great deal of blame to spread around, but most of it belongs on the backs of the University of California, which never integrated the laboratories into its financial and management control structures, and the Department of Energy, which failed to hold the University accountable. Los Alamos must make real change a change in which employees who in good faith bring problems to managements attention and openly discuss them without paying for it with their careers and their financial and emotional well-being. Until this happens, there will not be a free and open discussion of problem areas, nor will there be proper remedies. But the Universitys recent responses on questions Rep. Markey and others have raised about specific whistleblower cases are not particularly encouraging. As this competition goes forward, the issue of openness and responsiveness should be a critical factor in assessing bids. - 30 - (Contact: Laura Sheehan, 202-225-3641) | |
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