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Statement of Center for Medicare Advocacy
The recent investigative report
in The New York Times describing the new phenomenon of private equity
firms’ taking over multi-state nursing home chains and the declining quality of
care for residents that results[1]
has brought to the public’s attention two important issues – the nursing home
industry’s use of public reimbursement for private gain, rather than to provide
high quality care to residents, and the poor quality care experienced by
residents of many nursing homes.
The separation of nursing home
management from nursing home property is highlighted by the phenomenon of
private equity’s recent interest in the nursing home industry, but the issue is
not unique to private equity firms. The mechanism has been actively promoted
as a way for nursing home companies to avoid liability from public regulatory
agencies as well as from private litigants.[2]
Over the years, chains other than private equity firms have used multiple
corporations to hide assets and avoid creditors and have used public
reimbursement to purchase unrelated businesses.
In a three-day series published November
18-20, 2007, the Hartford Courant reported that Haven Healthcare, a
Connecticut-based chain caring for nearly 2000 residents in Connecticut,
provided seriously inadequate care at 10 of its 15 facilities in the state.[3]
The chain failed to pay multiple creditors and the owner is accused of diverting
reimbursement to fund his investment in a country music recording company in Nashville, Tennessee and personal real estate. On the third day of the series, the chain
and its 44 related entities filed for bankruptcy.[4]
The private equity takeover of
nursing home chains has led to many calls for more “transparency” in ownership
of nursing homes. Requiring full and comprehensive disclosure of ownership
information is a useful, but not sufficient, step to improving quality of care
and quality of life for residents. More specific substantive changes are also required
to ensure that residents receive the care they need.
There is no single answer to
problems of poor quality of care and poor quality of life in nursing homes; multiple
efforts are needed. Many solutions have already been identified. Congress
should
1. Enact meaningful nurse
staffing ratios. Congress needs to enact specific staffing ratios to
ensure that facilities employ sufficient numbers of professional and
paraprofessional nurses to provide care to residents.
Nurse staffing is the single best
predictor of good quality of care. Residents need to be cared for by professional
nurses and by sufficient numbers of well-trained, well-supervised, and
well-supported paraprofessional workers.
The current standard in federal
law is “sufficient” staff to meet residents’ needs, including one registered
nurse eight consecutive hours per day seven days per week.[5]
This standard, enacted in 1987 as part of the Nursing Home Reform Law, has not
worked to ensure that facilities have sufficient numbers of well-qualified and
well-trained staff.
In 2001, the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS) submitted a report to Congress documenting that
more than 91% of facilities fail to have sufficient staff to prevent avoidable
harm and that 97% of facilities do not have sufficient staff to meet the
comprehensive requirements of the Nursing Home Reform Law.[6]
Raising reimbursement rates in
the hope that facilities will increase their staffing levels as a result does
not improve staffing. Congress increased Medicare reimbursement rates in 2000,
specifically for nurse staffing.[7]
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that staffing levels
remained stagnant and that staffing increased only when states mandated explicit
staffing ratios or made other policy changes specifically directed at
increasing nurse staffing.[8]
The staffing ratios that CMS and
other experts identified nearly a decade ago need to be mandated and
implemented.[9]
2. Require accountability for
public reimbursement. Congress needs to ensure that public reimbursement through
Medicare and Medicaid funding is spent, as Congress intends, on the care of
people who live in nursing homes. In testimony before this Subcommittee, Professor
Charlene Harrington described the concern: Medicare reimbursement is based on
specific amounts for various components of care, such as nurse staffing, but
once a facility receives Medicare reimbursement, it can spend the money in
whatever way it chooses. Professor Harrington called for cost centers and
for rules prohibiting facilities from shifting reimbursement from one cost
center to another (e.g., from staffing to administration). The Center for
Medicare Advocacy supports Professor Harrington’s recommendation that Congress
ensure that public funds are used for their intended purpose.
Recent reports about the purchase
of Manor Care by the Carlyle Group indicate that when the sale is completed,
Manor Care’s CEO Paul Ormond, whose compensation was $18,800,000 last year, may
receive between $118,000,000 and $186,000,000 through the exercise of stock
options.[10]
3. Increase and stabilize funding
for survey and certification activities. The budget for survey and
certification activities needs to be increased at the state and federal levels
to allow for sufficient numbers of well-trained, multi-disciplinary staff to
conduct annual, revisit, and complaint surveys. At present, the federal
government spends less than ½ of 1% monitoring care in nursing homes, compared
with the amount spent on the care itself.[11]
Limited survey budgets lead to
insufficient numbers of survey staff. Without a strong survey system to detect
deficiencies, and the enforcement actions that may be imposed for documented
deficiencies, many facilities will not provide care to residents in compliance
with federal standards.[12]
4. Strengthen the enforcement
system. Congress needs to ensure that enforcement is swift, certain,
comprehensive, and meaningful. In the 1987 Nursing Home Reform Law, Congress required
the Secretary and states to take a stronger enforcement approach to
deficiencies: it required that the Secretary and states have a comprehensive strategy
for enforcement; enact and use a full range of intermediate sanctions; impose
more significant sanctions for deficiencies that are repeated or uncorrected; and
shorten the time between identifying the problem and imposing remedies. The
federal regulations did not implement this statutory mandate and have failed to
ensure compliance with federal standards of care.
In its most recent nursing home report,[13]
the GAO reiterated once again, as it has consistently and repeatedly reported
since 1998, that the enforcement system is too lax and too tolerant of poor
care for residents and that it allows most facilities to avoid meaningful
consequences for their deficiencies.
- Deficiencies are not cited.
The GAO[14]
and State Auditors[15]
repeatedly report that surveyors fail to identify and cite many
deficiencies.
- Deficiencies are described as
less serious than they actually are. Many deficiencies are identified as
causing no harm to residents when, in fact, they cause harm.[16]
- Deficiencies that are cited do
not lead to sanctions or lead to only minimal sanctions. Remedies that
are discretionary are imposed infrequently; per day and per instance civil
money penalties are often imposed at the lower ends of the allowable range;
and temporary management is almost unknown. The Secretary does not impose
denial of payment for all Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, as
authorized by law.[17]
While CMS could use additional
enforcement tools, such as the state remedy of denial of all admissions, the
GAO has repeatedly shown that CMS and state survey agencies do not use the full
range of remedies they currently have.
Despite these serious
shortcomings, recent research demonstrates that the survey and enforcement
system is essential to securing compliance by nursing facilities. Without the
system, facilities do not make necessary changes.[18]
The nursing home industry advocates
for weakened enforcement and calls for alternative, ineffectual, “voluntary”
collaboration between survey agencies and nursing homes
The nursing home industry opposed
the comprehensive enforcement provisions of the Nursing Home Reform Law as the
law was being enacted in 1987 and it has continued its opposition ever since,
often trying to weaken the law or undermine it, or both. For example, the
American Health Care Association unsuccessfully challenged the per instance
civil money penalty regulation that the Health Care Financing Administration
promulgated in 1999.[19]
Over the years, the industry has also developed a series of voluntary “quality
initiatives” – Quest for Quality, Quality First, Advancing
Excellence in America’s Nursing Homes – that promise a commitment to high
quality care, but that undermine the regulatory system by establishing
alternative criteria for evaluating nursing facilities. In contrast to the
criteria established by the regulatory system, these industry criteria reflect
secret goals and targets for improvement that are voluntary, self-reported and
unaudited, and lack public accountability.[20]
Voluntary efforts, such as those used
by Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs), do not improve care for
residents. A recent evaluation of the National Nursing Home Improvement
Collaborative found that the QIO’s $1,400,000 project to reduce the incidence
and prevalence of pressure ulcers in 35 nursing facilities (all members of
multi-state chains) “did not significantly affect the overall rate of [pressure
ulcers or PUs],” although it “substantially reduced the rate of Stage III and
IV PUs.”[21]
The researchers, who are primarily affiliated with the QIO community, recommend
excluding Stage I and II pressure ulcers from publicly-disclosed pressure ulcer
rates. They also recommend reporting “process” measures, rather than “outcome”
measures of pressure ulcer prevalence and incidence. These changes would make
facilities appear to be doing a better job in addressing pressure ulcers – and reported
pressure ulcer rates would suddenly fall – but they would not improve actual outcomes
for residents. The American Health Care Association applauds nursing homes’
collaborative work with QIOs and “encourages CMS to swiftly adopt the study’s
recommended changes for measuring pressure ulcers.”[22]
Conclusion
The New York Times
identified problems in nursing home care when private equity firms take over
nursing homes. These problems extend beyond private equity firms and reflect
problems throughout the nursing home industry. Congress needs to act in order
to ensure that standards of care, including staffing levels, are high and that
they are meaningfully and effectively enforced.
About the Center for Medicare Advocacy, Inc.
The
Center for Medicare Advocacy is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that
works to obtain fair access to Medicare and necessary health care for older
people and people with disabilities. The Center, founded in 1986, provides
education, analytical research, advocacy, and legal assistance to help older
people and people with disabilities obtain necessary health care. The Center
focuses on the needs of Medicare beneficiaries, people with chronic conditions,
and those in need of long‑term care. The Center provides training on
Medicare and health care rights throughout the country and serves as legal
counsel in litigation of importance to Medicare beneficiaries nationwide.
[1] Charles Duhigg, “More Profit and Less Nursing at
Many Homes,” The New York Times (Sep. 23, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/business/23nursing.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
As the Wall Street Journal observed, Manor Care was a desirable
take-over target for the Carlyle Group because it owns most of its real estate
and because 73% of its revenues come from Medicare and private-pay residents,
compared to 53% for some of its competitors. Theo Francis, “Real Estate Is
Driver Of Manor Care Buyout Deal; Nursing-Home Firms, Attractive at Moment, Are
Acquisition Targets,” The Wall Street Journal (July 3, 2007). An editorial in
McKnight’s Long Term Care expressed the concern that if the
Carlyle Group acts like “a typical private equity firm, . . . we can expect to
see aggressive cost-cutting including layoffs.” John O’Connor, “Opinion – The
Big Picture: Manor Care and the future,” McKnight’s LongTerm Care (Aug. 8, 2007),
http://www.mcknightsonline.com/content/index.php?id=24&tx_ttnews[swords]=Manor%20Care&tx_ttnews[pointer]=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4040&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=2184780248.
[2]
Joseph E. Casson and Julia McMillen, “Protecting Nursing Home Companies:
Limiting Liability through Corporate Restructuring,” Journal of Health Law,
Vol. 36, No. 4, page 577 (Fall 2003),
http://www.proskauer.com/news_publications/published_articles/content/2003_12_02.
[3]
Lisa Chedekel and Lynne Tuohy, “No Haven for the Elderly; Nursing Home Troubles
Show Flaws in State Oversight,” Hartford Courant (Nov. 18, 2007),
http://www.courant.com/news/custom/topnews/hc-haven1.artnov18,0,1229473.story?coll=hc_tab01_layout.
[4]
Lynne Tuohy and Lisa Chedekel, “Nursing Home Takeover Sought; After Haven Files
for Bankruptcy, Blumenthal Wants Trustee to Control Facilities,” Hartford Courant (Nov. 22, 2007),
http://www.courant.com/news/custom/topnews/hc-haven1122.artnov22,0,5263895.story;
Lisa Chedekel and Lynne Tuohy, “Haven Debt Woes,” Hartford Courant (Nov.
20, 2007),
http://www.courant.com/news/custom/topnews/hc-haven3.artnov20,0,2146972.story?coll=hc_tab01_layout.
Haven Healthcare’s bankruptcy filing is at
http://www.courant.com/media/acrobat/2007-11/33896687.pdf.
[5]
42 U.S.C. §§1395i-3(b)(4)(C)(i), 1396r(b)(4)(C)(i)(1), Medicare and Medicaid,
respectively.
[6]
CMS, Appropriateness of Minimum Nurse Staffing Ratios in Nursing Homes,
Phase II Final Report, pages 1-6, 1-7 (Dec. 2001),
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/CertificationandComplianc/12_NHs.asp
(scroll down to Phase II report) [hereafter CMS 2001 Nurse Staffing Report].
[7]
Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000,
Pub.L. 106-554, App. F, §312(a), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-498.
[8]
GAO, Available Data Show Average Nursing Staff Time Changes Little after
Medicare Payment Increase, GAO-03-176, page 3 (Nov. 2002),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03176.pdf.
Nurse staffing time increased by 1.9 minutes per day; registered nurse time
decreased and licensed practical nurse and aide time increased.
[9]
Using empirical data, the 2001 CMS staffing report identified 3.55 – 4.1 hours
per resident day as the number of nurse staffing hours needed to prevent
avoidable harm to residents. In the simulation component of the staffing
study, CMS identified, as appropriate ratios of certified nurse assistants to
residents to meet the requirements of federal law, 8:1 on the day shift, 10:1
on the evening shift, and 20:1 on the night shift. CMS, 2001 Nurse Staffing
Report, supra note 8. These ratios are similar to those identified
by an expert panel convened by the John A. Hartford Institute for Geriatric
Nursing, Division of Nursing, at New York University: 4.13 hours per resident
day for direct nursing care staff (ratios for direct care staff, 5:1 on the day
shift; 10:1 on the evening shift; and 15:1 on the night shift). Charlene
Harrington, Christine Kovner, Mathy Mezey, Jeanie Kayser-Jones, Sarah Burger,
Martha Mohler, Robert Burke, and David Zimmerman, “Experts Recommend Minimum
Nurse Staffing Standards for Nursing Facilities in the United States,” The
Gerontologist, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2000, 5-16.
[10]
Homer Brickey, “Manor Care sale would enrich execs; Toledo firm’s officials may
receive more than $200 million for stock,” The Toledo Blade (July 6, 2007),
http://toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070706/BUSINESS03/707060449/-1/BUSINESS.
[11]
National spending on nursing home care in 2005 was $80.6 billion ($21.6 billion
for Medicare; $59.0 billion for Medicaid). Georgetown University Long-Term
Care Financing Project, “National Spending for Long-Term Care” (Fact Sheet,
Feb. 2007), http://ltc.georgetown.edu/pdfs/natspendfeb07.pdf.
The federal survey budget for states for all survey activities is $293 million
for fiscal year 2008. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008,
Appendix (Department of Health and Human Services), page 23,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/appendix/hhs.pdf.
In general, more than three-quarters of state survey agency time is focused on
nursing homes.
[12]
Helena Louwe, Carla Perry, Andrew Kramer (Health Care Policy and Research,
University of Colorado Health Sciences Center), Improving Nursing Home
Enforcement: Findings from Enforcement Case Studies page 44 (March 22,
2007),
http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/SNF_FinalEnforcementReport.03.07.pdf
(“Although ‘the case studies revealed that enforcement actions, if executed,
have only a limited positive effect . . . it must be recognized that nursing
home behavior changes seldom occurred without a formal citation.” [hereafter University of Colorado,
Improving Nursing Home Enforcement]).
[13]
GAO, Efforts to Strengthen Federal Enforcement Have Not Deterred Some Homes
from Repeatedly Harming Residents, GAO-07-241 (March 2007),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07241.pdf
[hereafter GAO 2007 Report]. The GAO has issued more than a dozen reports on
nursing home survey and certification issues since 1998. These reports are
listed at pages 92-93 of the 2007 report.
[14] See, e.g., GAO, Nursing Home Deaths: Arkansas Coroner Referrals
Confirm Weaknesses in State and Federal Oversight of Quality of Care,
GAO-05-78 (Nov. 2004),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07241.pdf.
See also University of Colorado, Improving Nursing Home Enforcement,
supra note 12.
[15] See, e.g., California State Auditor, Department of Health Services:
Its Licensing and Certification Division Is Struggling to Meet State and
Federal Oversight Requirements for Skilled Nursing Facilities, 2006-106
(April 2007), http://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2006-106.pdf
[hereafter California Auditor 2007]; Colorado State Auditor, Nursing
Facility Quality of Care: Department of Public Health and Environment,
Department of Health Care Policy and Financing (Performance Audit) (Feb.
2007),
http://www.leg.state.co.us/OSA/coauditor1.nsf/All/D2FC96140165870D8725728400745D8C/$FILE/1767%20NurseHomePerf%20Feb%202007.pdf
[hereafter Colorado Auditor 2007].
[16]
GAO, Nursing Home Quality: Prevalence of Serious Problems, While Declining,
Reinforces Importance of Enhanced Oversight, GAO-03-561 (2003),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03561.pdf;
California Auditor, supra note 15; Colorado Auditor; supra note
15.
[17]
GAO 2007 Report, supra note 13.
[18]
University of Colorado, Improving Nursing Home Enforcement, supra note
14.
[19] American Health Care Association v. Shalala, D.D.C., Civil No.
1:99CV01207 (GK) (case dismissed, March 6, 2000), unsuccessfully challenging final regulations published at 64 Fed. Reg. 13,354 (March 18, 1999), 42 C.F.R. §§488.430(a), 488.438(a)(2).
[20]
Center for Medicare Advocacy, The “New” Nursing Home Quality Campaign: Déjà
vu All Over Again (Sep. 21, 2006),
http://medicareadvocacy.org/AlertPDFs/2006/06_09.21.SNFQualityCampaign.pdf.
[21]
Joanne Lynn, Jeff West, Susan Hausmann, David Gifford, Rachel Nelson, Paul
McGann, Nancy Bergstrom, and Judith A. Ryan, “Collaborative Clinical Quality
Improvement for Pressure Ulcers in Nursing Homes,” Journal of American
Geriatric Society 55:1663-1669 (2007) (quoted language at 1668).
[22]
AHCA, “American Health Care Association Praises Collaborative Efforts with
Quality Improvement Organizations to Enhance Patient Outcomes” (News Release,
Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.ahcancal.org/News/news_releases/Pages/22Oct2007.aspx.
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