Good afternoon.  Senator Cantwell, as the chair of this committee, I’d like to thank you and the remainder of the committee members for holding this important hearing concerning a subject that has consumed a good portion of my life for the last seven years.  I’d also like to start off by thanking Senator Snowe whose name I recognize as both the ranking member of this committee but also as a supporter of the Coast Guard and a desired Deepwater acceleration.

 

I am Kevin Jarvis a recent retiree from the United States Coast Guard, the military organization I have loved for over 29 years of commissioned service. I proudly wear my retirement pin for all to see. Because of my continued unmatched loyalty and love for this magnificent organization and the service it provides the United States, this specific topic (Deepwater) and the unfortunate negative publicity it has cast undeservedly on many of the men and women of Coast Guard, and my unique familiarity with many of the Deepwater tactical and strategic decisions, policies and resultant outcomes, I elected to come and testify today after a long train ride from Florida.  In providing this testimony, it is my solitary hope that it can assist you and the Coast Guard make this very important and critically needed asset acquisition program more effective, cost efficient and transparent, and most importantly, as the good stewards we’re supposed to be, more accountable to the American public.

 

A short synopsis of my background is as follows:  I am a career Coast Guard commissioned officer who has spent a predominance of my service in Naval Engineering and logistic related assignments. From the deck plates and bilges in three different cutters, my selection as the DOT-U.S. Coast Guard 1993 Federal Engineer of the Year, to my final assignment as the Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard’s Engineering Logistic Center (ELC), I’ve seen, and/or done virtually everything a Naval Engineer could do.   In addition to my Coast Guard Academy education (BSE in Electrical Engineering), I’ve been fortunate enough acquire two Master Degrees from the University of Michigan in the areas of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, and Mechanical Engineering.  Moreover, I acquired a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College; as a Naval Engineer, attending the Naval War College is a relative rarity. Lastly, I completed, in concurrence with my last Commanding Officer assignment, a Master of Science degree in Quality Systems Management with an emphasis in Six Sigma from the National Graduate School. It was a result of many of these engineering experiences, educational qualifications, proven leadership attributes and lucky timing that was I introduced as a G-S representative to the Deepwater program.

 

Prior to any detailed discussion I have on the Deepwater program, let me state that I have read the recent DHS IG report dated Jan 2007 and agree with their findings and recommendations. Additionally, I’ve been provided a copy of the Commandant’s recent congressional testimony on this subject and I fully believe Admiral Allen’s legitimate emphasis and desire for program transparency, greater accountability and formally shifting technical authority from the contractor or elements of the acquisition directorate to the more rightful owner, the engineers within the CG-4 directorate are excellent steps in the right direction.

 

 

The contract strategy was in reality pretty simple and elegant to describe, but due to its uniqueness, getting any type of details beyond the “concept” was virtually impossible to acquire.  This Systems of Systems, performance based contract was to have as its major hallmarks; a “Systems” integrator to ensure all the working parts of the delivered assets worked together; a performance based contract that, with the exception of the National Security Cutter (NSC) which was relatively detailed in the Systems Performance Specification (SPS) Section 3.8, was all about the final performance of the “built out system”; a heavy reliance on Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) and Commercial And Non-Developmental Items (CANDI); and an assortment of virtually every Contract Line Item (CLIN) billing strategy imaginable.  The Contractor’s performance would supposedly be monitored and assessed through the System’s increased Operational Effectiveness (OpEff), lower Total Ownership Costs (TOC), and Customer Satisfaction.  The strategy was indeed unique. Building the contract details, simultaneously moving down a very aggressive Request For Proposal (RFP) timeline concurrent with three separate industry teams desiring contract related guidance, and building the program and directorate support staffs all at the same time would prove to be an almost imaginable task. This constant dance between pre-set time driven requirements and necessary performance specifics would only get worse as the contract matured.

 

Moreover, it was readily apparent to many prior to award with the three industry teams and immediately after award to ICGS that the implementation of this simple and elegant strategy would be extremely complex to manage properly and virtually impossible to hold the contractor’s feet to many of the performance measures since it was all built on the “end state” System of Systems performance; ergo we’d have to really wait until 2020 or so to really see if we ultimately got what we paid for. The contractor could easily state that a missed mark in articulated performance with an early delivery asset would be accounted for in a later version of another asset, or some other part of the still undeveloped part of the Systems of Systems planned concept. This became a constant moving target when trying to pin down any given System’s performance at any given point in time. Making matters worse was the fact that the Coast Guard couldn’t develop an accurate and repeatable OpEff model in time for the various industry teams to insert their System of System numbers and justify “real” OpEff increases from their contract proposal.  Eventually, with the established RFP solicitation date fast approaching the Coast Guard and industry teams settled on a “Presence Model” that evaluated the industry team’s proposal based on asset presence and coverage capabilities of locations and missions only; lost was the assessment of an integrated solution where the sum would exceed the individual parts!

 

To make matter worse was the accepted realization that any induced Coast Guard changes in mission requirements, workforce management, maintenance needs, funding issues or virtually anything that could impact the “Systems of System” performance, could be the trigger for any of the contractors to ask for, and probably be awarded, a contract modification for either more money, more time, or readjustment of the already difficult to mandate operational effectiveness baseline.  Here was another flaw in the contract strategy.  To try and hold the contractor accountable for any Coast Guard induced change, adjustments to the OpEff model and measurements against an established and agreed upon baseline would be needed. This was a very transparent problem that was immediately highlighted after the needed Coast Guard mission changes from 9/11.

 

As mentioned previously, only the NSC had any level of real defined and measurable asset performance requirements.  The remainders of the System of Systems deliverables were virtually non-defined and were left to the individual industry teams to be innovative and propose an integrated solution for a 20+ year performance period.  This enabled each industry team to propose an assortment of near term and out year ideas with costs estimates which were difficult to defend but even more difficult for the Coast Guard to analyze as rational and reasonable. As a result, cost proposal, TOC numbers and the process for fitting them into the annual coast constraints imposed by the Coast Guard as an acceptable bid was a skill mastered by the winning industry team, yet appeared to be elusive for justification and repeatability. 

 

COTS and CANDI equipments are great catch words and were to be the basis of matching innovation’s potential higher costs with already proven, mature designs and equipment with supportable and manageable supply chains.  With a reliance on COTS/CANDI, the contract strategy often associated itself with the minimization of Acquisition, Construction and Improvement (AC&I) monies being funneled towards research and developmental (R&D) concepts.  Yet another contract enforcement flaw became apparent as the term “innovativeness” was often inserted by the contractors and accepted by the Deepwater program for what would otherwise be categorized as R&D initiatives. How else could the VUAV which only existed as a scaled model of a potential aircraft option, shipboard radars with never before achieved acquisition and detection capabilities, stern ramp designs on ships the size of the NSC, or the original CASA proposal which was at best, an unproven hybrid of other CASA platforms have survived the award process.  Each of the above are representative examples of concepts which have since, crashed when sized up from the model, have been substituted by more conventional designs, or replaced in their entirety.

 

As for the System’s Integrator, this entity was advertised to be the glue that pulled all the individual asset pieces together into a collective product with measurable and increased performance returns. Individual assets were to mutually support and/or augment each other.  New asset “cradle to grave” logistic supporting requirements, maintenance activities, workforce apportionments, funding streams, and legacy asset sustainment and replacement schedules were all intersecting challenges that were supposed to be more efficiently and effectively managed through the use of the System’s Integrator. Much of these advertised Integrator outcomes have failed to materialize. 

 

New asset logistic improvements, both processes and supporting IT systems have been painfully absent.  Throughout the shortened life of the first delivered asset, the 123, logistic support and complete supply chain management for Deepwater introduced equipment was marginal at best. The story doesn’t improve much for the other surface assets. Although there is more than enough positive rhetoric from the contractor and the Deepwater program, the fact that NSC #1 is now floating and getting closer to an operational status with many of the needed logistical support details and deliverables still ill defined, is indeed troubling.  Although the ICGS position that a particular shipboard system will be supported by a performance based contract is indeed refreshing and in alignment with many other government support strategies, a failure to produce any concrete examples of either the breadth and depth of these contracts, and more importantly where the gaps will exist between performance based contract boundaries was the state of affairs when I left the Coast Guard last June; I am unaware if much has changed since.  The fact that the Integrator failed to adequately respond to repeated calls for surface asset logistic details, failed to utilize or show any real purpose of the expensive Business Process Assessment and Redesign initiatives, benignly watched as replacement after replacement rotated through the top position of the Contractor’s logistic organization begs the question; where is the return on the investment for this high priced Integrator? I submit that this was and still is one of the biggest contract flaws associated the Deepwater program. The Coast Guard relied on significant Integrator involvement, influence and accountability to enable the Systems of Systems acquisition strategy.  The Integrator’s seemingly absent influence in key areas expected by the contract and their very real complicity in why we’re here today can not be overlooked when its painfully obvious that many of the initial contract strategies, requirements and deliverables which the Integrator was to be a significant enabler have either failed or are failing. Coast Guard management of the program is not without fault for these failures, but neither is what was billed by the elements of G-ADW and subsequently G-D, our “Strategic Partner”, the Integrator.

 

      

 

 

I was already aware of the basic Deepwater contract strategy through a variety of the internal Coast Guard publications prior to my official entry on November 2000 into the Deepwater experience as G-SDW.  Unfortunately, I was already aware of what was rumored to be troubling organizational differences between the elements of the G-ADW (predecessor of G-D) organization and many of the Coast Guard Headquarter Directorate personnel. In short order, I would find that these rumors were indeed very valid organizational problems which, in my opinion were critical and fundamental flaws in the execution of the planned acquisition strategy. Traditionally, and in accordance with the Systems Acquisition Manual (SAM), any major acquisition relies on the careful blending of the various Coast Guard directorates’ resources into what may be categorized as a purposefully designed set of acquisition checks and balances. In the simplest of terms and using only three of the many acquisition supporting directorates as an example, the Operational Directorate would assist with the development of the Mission Needs Statement, Operations Requirement Document and other operational related criteria.  The Engineering Directorate would assist with the necessary design standards, procedures, sustainment requirements and assessments to ensure that the Acquisition Directorate’s intended procurement would fulfill the mission needs established by the Operations Directorate.  Although the Acquisition Directorate was ultimately responsible for balancing cost, schedule and performance, the remaining support directorates were fully aware of, and greatly appreciative of the sometimes uncompromising cost, schedule and performance decisions. The Operations Directorate focused on operational capabilities and performance.  The Engineering Directorate would focus primarily on delivery performance and its long term corresponding elements of logistics and maintenance sustainment.  As proven with other recent and successful Coast Guard major acquisitions (WLB/WLM and Great Lakes Icebreaker), this very “healthy” balance and tension was expected to ensure the Coast Guard bought and built something it needed, could operate, and maintain for the expected life of the particular asset. With the Deepwater program, there would be nothing “healthy” about this balance. From the outset, this unhealthy situation, whose genesis lies imbedded in the overall procurement strategy, and the allowance granted to the Deepwater program to deviate from the SAM, would virtually compromise any chance for a successful execution of the Deepwater procurement plan.

 

In my capacity as the Engineering Logistic Center’s Platform Manager (tour length from summer 1998 to November 2000), I had the opportunity to witness first hand some of the new acquisition strategy concepts and how they would impact “traditional” acquisition processes.  One such instance was during the “review” and “reclassification” of hundreds of G-S previously provided engineering and ship design, construction and evaluation standards and principles.  During this review process, I witnessed the elements of G-ADW, question every existing standard for its alignment with the “Systems of Systems” strategy and its reliance on the contractor to be held only to delivering an asset to a contractually specified “performance standard”.  Many existing engineering standards, procedures, criteria and testing requirements were summarily classified as “too prescriptive” which if included in the certification matrix would unduly prevent the individual contract teams to be “innovative”.  The fact that this process took place at all was not as startling to me as was the context behind the Deepwater Program’s perceived motive for its purpose; changing from traditional and proven asset construction procedures and standards to one where greater latitude was given to the contractor to do what was right when it came to designing and building the surface fleet. With full cognizance by the program’s leadership, this was Deepwater’s first overt act of dismantling and disrupting the proven support directorate’s roles and responsibilities associated with a major acquisition. In my opinion, this was yet another critical program mis-step which placated the individual industry teams at the expense of time tested and proven Coast Guard organic technical resources. This dangerous and repeated tactic of contractor appeasement and dismissing unbiased internal Coast Guard technical assessments and recommendations has culminated with the need for this hearing. 

 

In November 2000, I was reassigned as an off season transfer, to fill the position as the Chief Systems’ Deepwater Integration Office (G-SDW).  I was responsible for the integration of all G-S’ organizational responsibilities, capabilities and technical input into the Deepwater acquisition. I had a staff of 10 personnel who represented the disciplines of surface, aviation, logistic and C4ISR.  As G-S’ Headquarter staff for Deepwater support, we coordinated and integrated the acquisition support program responsibilities and responses to their cognizant parts of the remaining internal and external pieces of the G-S organization. As an example, for the surface element of my staff, this meant Deepwater program coordination with G-SEN, ELC, the CG YARD, and both MLCs. I reported directly to G-S and had frequent, often daily meetings with my Admiral concerning the challenges and opportunities associated with Deepwater. From 2000 to 2002 this was RADM Ronald Silva. From 2002-2003, this was RADM Albert Kinghorn. As their direct representative to the Deepwater program, I attended all Deepwater related meeting which required 0-6 (Captain) presence and/or decision making, and often represented or accompanied the Admiral at those meetings requiring Flag presence.  Both Admirals trusted me implicitly and I had exceptionally wide latitude in not only speaking with G-S authority, but also establishing specific G-S positions on a variety of Deepwater related subjects.

 

Within days of reporting to G-SDW, getting briefs from my staff elements and visiting the corresponding players from the other directorates, including meetings with G-ADW, his deputy and his various APMs (program managers for the various assets), it was immediately apparent that the rumors of organizational problems were very real.  Since G-ADW was identified as a “Re-invention Site” it was provided deviation status from the existing Coast Guard acquisition manual and as a result, there were no established organizational Roles and Responsibilities with many of the other Directorates.  Moreover, many of the normal acquisition program necessities were being developed and implemented while still in the draft or early developmental stages.

 

On a timeline, the Coast Guard was still in the pre-award stage.  With three competing industry teams, having enough resources to cover all of the program or directorate needs was a constant challenge for all the directorate staffs including G-ADW.  It was during this hectic, and very fast paced time that more of the fundamental program aspects and the concept of a “Systems of Systems” strategy with a program and asset integrator became better defined.  It was also during this pre-award period that more organizational friction points were spawned.  G-ADW elements started using the phrase “Change Agent” more frequently and the Machiavellian justification of the program’s “ends will justify the means” as some of their overarching guiding principles.  To G-ADW, their mandate was to inculcate this acquisition philosophy change and its resultant organizational upheavals into the Coast Guard.  In simple terms, this meant that for real acquisition change to occur, anything that mirrored the way something was currently done, or done in the past, could not be a part of the Deepwater acquisition tactical plan.  As the G-S senior (with the exception of G-S himself) representative to the program, I immediately sensed that the locked doors of the Deepwater spaces and controlled access afforded the G-ADW staff much more than just procurement security during the contract development and pre-award period.  It was a very convenient mechanism of keeping all but “cleared” Coast Guard elements from entering their spaces as G-ADW virtually isolated themselves purposefully from the remainder of the Coast Guard.  Although all of the SDW and other Deepwater support directorate staffs were “cleared” and had access to the G-ADW staff, it became readily apparent from my in briefs and difficulty in getting details on many of the G-ADW current “goings-on” that the SDW staff was missing many important contract development and contract process meetings.  We were “invited” to only those meetings and strategy sessions when the G-ADW staff thought it was appropriate to do so. To a certain extent, G-ADW had a two year jump on me and many of what proved to be flawed execution strategies and tactics were already in place and firmly inculcated in the G-ADW staff elements.  My first direct order to my staff was “G-S will no longer be rolled by G-ADW”, followed in succession by “Attend every meeting we’re invited to, and barge into every one we weren’t invited to but should have”, and finally, “document everything and act with my authority as SDW”. The SDW staff immediately and with great zeal, increased our presence in the locked spaces of G-ADW and although unwanted by G-ADW, began asserting more of our traditional acquisition support roles and responsibilities.

 

Concurrent with this, we increased liaison, communication and information flows with not only our G-S internal and external Headquarter staffs, but also the other acquisition support directorate staffs. Acknowledging what I call a “mischief gap” that G-ADW had with the SAM deviation approval, I worked to close this opening by establishing a formal set of agreed upon roles and responsibilities between G-S and G-ADW which would stabilize and hopefully mend broken organizational fences.  Due to the existing anti G-S culture within G-ADW and the reluctance of the existing Deepwater program manager to even entertain such an initiative, it took over 8 months of concerted effort with my classmate in the G-ADW organization while waiting for G-ADW to retire.  Although only 6 relatively short paragraphs long, this roles and responsibilities agreement was powerful in that it formally established a more defined relationship between G-S and G-D (note that by this time, G-ADW had been reclassified as G-D) elements. In simple terms, G-S was to establish and provide the engineering and logistical expertise and advice to G-D.  G-D was to use these G-S provided inputs in the development of the program as it procured new assets and services.  This agreement also accounted for any unforeseen or non-existent policies, and instructed both organizations to collaborate together in their development. Signed by both G-S, RADM Silva, and G-D, RADM Stillman, the memo was approved by the Coast Guard’s Vice Commandant, VADM Collins on 27 July 2001.  Although accepted and approved by the highest levels of both directorates, it became quickly apparent that it would be just another piece of Coast Guard policy that G-D elements would decide not to honor.  If there was ever doubt before hand, it was now crystal clear that the bedrock placed by G-ADW was being cemented in place by G-D; the G-S engineering and logistics expertise were not a priority.  Through the contract, the Deepwater program was expected to be supported by a “World Class” ship builder and their cognizant engineering design staffs. Any interim G-D program engineering expertise could be purchased through a multitude of readily available engineering support contractors. Concurrent with this intended and carefully crafted effort to minimize the need for any G-S technical or logistic input was the steady build up of a duplicative naval engineering technical capability within the G-D staff elements. Initially advertised as nothing more than additional  engineering resources to “manage’ the surface portions of the contract, these same naval engineering elements, both military and subcontractors, quickly became the mouth pieces of the contractor and virtually squashed any and all engineering design, maintenance and sustainment concerns from the G-S engineers.  This “World Class” ship builder reference would be used time and time again by the G-D elements whenever a difference of technical or logistical positions between G-S and G-D occurred.  With the “World Class” industry partners giving G-D all the input they needed, the G-S assessments, concerns and recommendations were often given nothing more than lip service and summarily dismissed. As will be discussed shortly, the Integrated Process Team (IPT) environment would be the cooking crucible for many heated discussions which primarily sided with the G-D, and the industry position.

 

 

A key process management ingredient of the Deepwater strategy was the tactical execution of IPTs.  These teams were comprised of representatives of G-D, the program supporting directorates, and industry personnel. They existed at every aspect and every level of the program from the strategic Flag level, Overarching IPT (OIPT) and 0-6 Integrating IPTs (IIPT), to the more tactical Long Range Interceptor IPT which often consisted of Lieutenants and below. Typically chaired by either ICGS or G-D elements, they were touted as the entities where the majority of problems and issues would be resolved.  Enhanced communications, collaboration, consensus and sound program decisions were expected characteristics of each IPT. Although some IPTs were more successful than others, most did not function as planned for a varied of reasons; newness of the concept with poor training, trust issues, communication issues, resource issues, etc.  Of all the IPTs, the surface IPTs in specific were the most volatile.  It is safe to say that for the most part, the entire category of surface IPTs, (NSC, OPC, FRC, 123, etc) became cauldrons of discourse, resentment, mistrust, and even more caustic organizational fractures.

 

The immediate disagreement of established roles and responsibilities (in spite of the signed G-D/G-S memo) was in my opinion the singular cause for these IPT failures.  A careful investigation of all surface IPT problems will track back to this critically important disagreement.  With the recently signed Flag memo which stipulated G-S and G-D roles and responsibilities, G-SDW thought it now had the backing of the Vice Commandant to ensure our voice, concerns and recommendations were “honestly” evaluated as part of the IPT format.  The G-S recommendations not incorporated were expected to at least be explained and documented as part of the IPT’s decision process. Rarely did this occur. Since I was leading the G-S charge for incorporating the organizational roles signed by both G-D, G-S and approved by the Vice Commandant, I highlighted the program’s overt flaunting of these roles at every opportunity. As one might expect, the IIPT was on more than one occasion a very caustic environment.

 

Since all G-S surface IPT members worked either directly or indirectly for me, as G-SDW, I ensured that each G-S representative knew their approved role and at every IPT level, I was continually aware of the program’s flagrant failure to respect and comply with the Flag agreement.  In that regard, they all acted by my direction.  The G-S role was a critical program “check, balance, and technical assessment and recommendation” necessity.  With my years of engineering experience and variety of assignments, I had sufficient personal knowledge of the qualifications, personal attributes, and technical capabilities of most, if not all of the internal and external G-S and MLC logisticians and engineers who supported the Deepwater program with their thousands of years of proven engineering and logistical expertise. With the Flag memo in hand, I was not about to let this invaluable and irreplaceable organic Coast Guard capability be silently dismissed. In doing so, I ensured that each G-S IPT representative complied with the IPT rules for discussing our inputs, concerns, recommendations and documenting the IPT outcomes. It should be no surprise that the level of documentation on these related issues probably differs significantly between what’s retained by G-D and G-S elements.  We knew that with each and every dismissed G-S technical and logistic assessment and recommendation, we were traveling down a path that many, even very early in the program saw as an impending “train wreck”. The continual discussion within many G-S and MLC staffs was not if the wreck was going to happen, but how extensive it would be when it happened.

 

Although the continual role disagreement was a significant causal factor in the surface IPTs struggles to become functional entities, it was not the lone culprit.  Other progress inhibitors such as the actual IPTs membership, who decided who was to be a member, who the members worked for, how meetings were coordinated, managed, and documented, how problems were resolved, and how the IPTs would make decisions were noteworthy issues which were hallmarks of the early IPT troubles. 

 

IPT mechanics, intended characteristics and processes were described in the Deepwater program’s Project Maintenance Plan (PMP).  The PMP, would be the tactical execution of G-D’s Deepwater contract strategy.  To no surprise, many of the PMPs elements immediately became discussion hotspots.  G-D wanted all IPT members to report to the IPT chair.  Seeing this as a potential tactic to not only functionally, but also organizationally “control” and, or “manage” the IPT direction, this G-D desire was met with significant resistance with hard lines “drawn in the sand” from both G-S and the G-O IIPT representatives; other non-G-D IIPT representatives followed suit.  In our view, to ensure that the supporting organization’s representatives could confidently and safely, for their careers or employment for those civilian personnel, provide unbiased input and report back factual developments or concerns, they needed to stay out from under the thumb of the G-D IPT leads.

 

Early IPT problems also raised the concern over who actually would determine IPT membership representatives.  On more than one occasion, the surface IPT lead tried exerting his authority and remove G-S surface IPT representatives as formal members. Ostensibly the reason and justification was the IPT members were disruptive to any positive and necessary IPT decision making.  Although, it was not uncommon for the G-S IPT representatives to have strong and vociferous mannerisms in fulfilling their IPT roles, in my opinion, it was the critical discussions and concerns that these G-S IPT members had on any particular engineering or logistic issue that was the real underlying reasoning for their desired removal from the IPT by G-D APMs.  I thwarted this effort in both my SDW and later in my ELC Commanding Officer capacity.

 

Early IPT functionality was compromised by poor IPT management.  Meetings were often poorly advertised with sometimes only hours to respond, poorly documented or with the many resource challenges, poorly attended.  Established IPT agendas, with intended discussion items and articulated desired outcomes were rare.  With the plethora of possible issues, having knowledgeable, capable resources at the meetings was of a paramount importance to everyone. When these technical areas were covered with personal assets sometimes only one deep, it was critical to have the right person with the right talents and skills at the right meeting.  Due to poor agenda management, on more than one occasion the G-S IPT member was not the best available choice. In these circumstances, the G-S IPT representative would implement a “reach-back” effort to the more knowledgeable subject matter expert.  This “reach back” model was not readily accepted by G-D elements as an acceptable IPT representative strategy and was often ridiculed as not providing decision making “empowered” resources. In spite of this false “empowerment” claim, the “reach back” model worked very well for G-S and enabled a much more effective and efficient use of the limited AC&I funded project resources. Rarely was the absence of a G-S IPT member the cause of not making a decision.  To the contrary, it was because of our continued presence that planned IPT lead decisions were thoroughly discussed, evaluated and often questioned for supporting details and justification. Unfortunately, because of the induced time criticality of many program decision steps, the engineering decisions which would normally require and await much greater exploration and analysis, were made in the face of the G-S IPT representative’s objection.  The advertised IPT desire to achieve collaboration and consensus would quickly deviate to a model of unexplained or poorly justified IPT unilateral decisions by the IPT chair. This pervasive program tactic would come back to haunt the Coast Guard with the time driven pursuit of the 123 and NSC.

 

The PMP did identify an agreed upon IPT problem resolution process. It was the expected responsibility of each IPT to make the maximum effort to resolve problems at the lowest level.  When the circumstances prevented this, any particular non-consensus voting representative could raise the particular issue to the next higher IPT for discussion and possible resolution. It was expected that the higher level IPT would quickly decide the issue and give task direction to the lower IPT so as not to negatively impede the time criticality of the overall schedule.  Due to the sometimes overwhelming number of IPT non-consensus decisions at all levels, this perfect decision resolution scenario rarely was the timely solution it was hoped to be. Moreover, an additional IPT, between the IIPT and the OPIT was inserted after contract award. It was co-chaired by the G-D and ICGS Program Managers and was titled the Program Management Team (PMT). The PMT’s membership consisted of senior G-D, ICGS and other contractor personnel.  With the exception of the G-O Deepwater 0-6 representative who was allow to “call-in, there was no non-G-D routine presence at the meeting.  It was advertised, that if a G-S related decision was to be discussed at the PMT, the G-D PM would make every effort to ensure a G-S representative would be notified in a timely manner to be part of the discussion.  If for whatever reason our presence wasn’t possible, or an “unexpected” G-S related discussion topic just happened to surface at the PMT, the G-D PM felt comfortable he could represent any G-S concerns. The fact that the PMT was between the IIPT and the OMPT, by IPTs rules meant that any IIPT disagreement that would normally be brought up to the OIPT for resolution first needed to go thought the PMT. This became a very convenient joint G-D/ICGS mechanism to resolve program problems that escaped 0-6 solutions but didn’t need Flag involvement.  With no routine G-S presence we were often trying to reverse PMT “agreed upon” decisions after the fact.  Even when I or my deputy was invited for the discussion, we were not voting members. As a result, it was unreasonable to expect our discussion points to convince enough of the 18 G-D or ICGS PMT members to reach a favorable G-S decision. Needless to say, G-S was advised of these IIPT disagreement areas for eventual Flag to Flag discussions with G-D directly or as part of an OIPT “non agenda” discussion topic.  Sadly, the G-S influence or objection, even at the Flag level rarely carried the day and those that did would not have occurred without the direct support of the G-O Flag.

 

I suspect with the plethora of non-census and troubling IPT decisions, and the relatively slow progression of these concerns through each subsequent IPT level, the contract’s time reality somewhat supported the G-D APM’s pretext to unilaterally make their best decision and keep the program running forward, a concept I fundamentally agree with.  Unfortunately, what became very disturbing was the unusually high frequency at which this unilateral decision oddly turned out to be more aligned with the Deepwater contractor’s position than G-S’. As will be discussed later in the events surrounding the 123’WPB, the G-D position that the initial G-S 123 WPB technical concerns were unwarranted, was formally transmitted to G-S as follows: the ICGS engineering analysis was “good enough” and the 123 will move forward as planned. The fact that all eight 123 WPB’s suffered major structural failures, and are non functional Coast Guard assets is indicative of the dangers implicit with time driven decisions. With the constant reminder from the PEO himself, his deputy and PM for “ruthless execution of the contract”, more and more time based decisions would take priority over the performance concerns raised by G-S.  The “Iron Triangle” phrase of cost schedule and performance as coined by the G-D PM, was in more reality less a triangle and more of a rod with the only measurable dimensions of cost and schedule; performance in my opinion was becoming nothing more than a necessary word to be included with the other two. As long as the asset was delivered reasonably close to the planned delivery date, all was essentially well. Whatever performance we acquired with the asset would be computed into the OpEff model and if not sufficient or of the expected level, it would be accounted for by the contractor in later asset improvements or capabilities in the very fluid Systems of Systems grand plan. For example, any failure of the NSC to achieve the SPS required speed of 28 knots (which was still very much in question when I departed the service) was not as important as was meeting the scheduled NSC delivery date. So how does the contractor be held accountably?

 

During these early IPT “storming” evolutions, a new G-D initiated phrase and contract strategy was further defined.  With the expected value-add of “World Class” ship builders, and the fact that the contract enabled them to be innovative in delivering “performance”, the desired expectation of the supporting directorate IPT members was that they only need to acquire “insight” into the contractor’s proposal and planned asset details.  The traditional government requirement for contractor “oversight” was not part of the new acquisition strategy and “change agent” concepts.  Regardless, “oversight” of the contractor was not to be a G-S concern. Any discussion with G-D elements where the term “oversight” was used by G-S personnel was quickly corrected by senior program elements. Although it might not have been the G-S specified responsibility for contract “oversight”, this more benign G-D “insight” perspective and greater expectation that the contractor would do the right thing in providing us the contracted Systems of Systems performance was indeed very troubling.  In spite of the G-D staff’s continual corrections, many in G-S were very concerned with what appeared to be G-D’s laissez faire “oversight” position.

 

For the most part, these IPT realities and program disagreements plagued and challenged program progress from years before release of the RFP and well past the award date. Most were still very active when I left SDW in the spring of 2003 and were still raging even after I retired in 2006.  As such, the inability to effectively function at the lowest level of the program significantly hampered virtually every expected and projected contract deliverable.  This dysfunctional IPT problem was not news to anyone despite the carefully crafted Quad charts and reporting instruments by the program staff which typically minimized the reality.  As I did with my Flag in G-S, I feel confident the other IIPT members kept their Flags advised of the IPT troubles. Although the articulated position from senior G-D personnel was always of support and talked up the need for collaborative IPT decisions, it was also common knowledge that these same G-D senior personnel were losing patience with G-S’ continual requests for additional information, analysis or testing.  G-S performance warnings conflicted with the advertised performance attributes stipulated by the ICGS elements and trying to resolve them failed to conveniently mesh with the delivery schedule expectations. G-S’ “conservatism” was being cast by G-D senior personnel as obstructing timely contract progress. As time progressed, the terms of obstructionists and G-S were becoming linked by not only G-D elements but others as well.  Those who knew of the future we foresaw also knew that tagging G-S as an “obstructionists” was completely inappropriate.  Again, the 123 WPB non-performance realities, the G-S induced necessity to develop an alternative Fast Response Cutter (FRC) design and contract strategy, and the current NSC structural and performance issues seem to validate that time and money probably could have been better spent.

 

Due to the rather significant funding constrains established by G-ADW at the beginning of the program, all three industry teams would be indeed challenged to squeeze new asset replacements and the sustainment of the legacy deepwater fleet into a workable plan.  The ICGS proposal devised what I always thought was, if achievable, an elegant concept and solution for the aging 110 Patrol Boat class. With the110 hull deterioration issues articulated to all of the industry teams well in advance of the RFP issuance, each team had the opportunity to incorporate this “known 110 WPB hull condition” into their plans or contract bids. ICGS’s pre award plan always included a “stretched” 110, and the hull condition was accounted for with a “bided” amount of expected hull replacement. Collectively their proposal would lengthen the 110 to 123 feet with a stern extension and make other hull replacement efforts as needed so the life of the new 123 WPB would coincide with the FRC introduction where more funding flexibility seemed to exist.  Although an elegant concept solution, the G-S engineers almost immediately started raising concerns of both the stern launch design and the overall engineering and model testing analysis of the entire platform, which included the Short Range Prosecutor (SRP).  While in the pre-award phase, Coast Guard Technical Assistance Teams (TAT) were severely limited in the level of actual “engineering evaluations” and ability to transmit detected problems to any of the industry teams.  All communication transmittals were really limited to asking how their proposal would address a particular problem.  The level of communication and interchange was expected to change drastically after award in the IPT environment with collaboration and consensus the way of doing business. 

 

With the 123 WPB designated as the first delivered ICGS Deepwater asset, it was the first to get real intense G-S engineering and logistic reviews concerning the corresponding details unavailable during the pre-award period. Unfortunately, even in this new, less constrained contract environment, the engineering details surrounding the planned extension were less than desired by G-S engineers.  During IPT meetings, at all levels, a consistent message was coming from the G-S representatives; we were concerned about the stern ramp, how the SRP and 123 would act as a unit in the same sea way, and the overall structural integrity of the 110 hull girder.  Repeated requests were made for the timely delivery of the contract required CDRLs which hopefully would include some of the needed engineering analysis to answer these quesions. Concurrent with these requests were the arrival of scheduled contract “review gates” that supposedly were to be successfully negotiated prior to progressing forward with the release of a Delivery Task Order (DTO) authorizing additional ICGS work.

 

These gates consisted of a Preliminary Design Review (PDR), a Contract Design Review (CDR), and a Production Readiness Review (PRR), all of which needed to be successfully completed prior to awarding the DTO to initiate the 1^st 110 conversion. Documentation exists that clearly indicates G-S’ engineering concerns with the lack of received CDRLs and the corresponding engineering analysis to enable a successful pass though each and every one of these contract gates. In spite of these documented concerns, the G-D surface APM concluded, from non-unanimous IPT inputs (G-S and G-O objected), that the contractor had successfully completed first the PDR in Oct 2002, then the CDR in Dec 2002 and finally the PRR in Jan 2003.  As a schedule driven decision, this VERY quick completion of three major contract gates enabled the timely arrival of the CGC MATAGORDA in February 2003 and the start of what would be an ill-fated hull extension. It was during the accelerated contract completion of these gates where the ICGS provided engineering analysis for the 110 conversion was deemed as “good enough” by the G-D surface APM.  With the impending APM unilateral decision, I ensured the IIPT was advised and warned that the110 PDR, CDR and PRR were to be inappropriately declared successful.  Even with the strongest objections at each and every contract review step, my voice and my IIPT vote was clearly insufficient as the G-D PM concurred with his APM’s decision each and every time. Even when any chance of winning the IIPT seemed lost, a last plea for caution was proposed by G-SDW; build only one 123 WPB as a full scale prototype and test the hull structure and the SRP interface with the stern ramp. If the design appeared sound after a prescribed test and evaluation period, the subsequent DTO’s could be released to restart the 110 modification line.  This was also dismissed due to overriding schedule and cost priorities.  With all options seemingly lost, in December 2002, G-S sent a memo to G-D indicating that because of our overall engineering concerns with the 123 WPB, no additional G-S controlled maintenance monies would be directed to MATAGORDA after the cutter’s departure.  This memo, along with virtually every other engineering concern G-S could muster failed to slow down the schedule driven 123 WPB conversion process.

 

Very similar G-S concerns with the ICGS 123 WPB logistic support plan were running concurrent with the above cutter extension part of the project. Observing what appeared to be a significant logistic capability gap in ICGS’ proposal, G-S offered a “bridging logistic strategy” which would enable adequate logistic supply support until the ICGS logistic concept was ready for deployment. As with the engineering memo, this one was also disregarded by G-D acting under the advice of the ICGS logistic support staff.  The conversion results, the current non-operational use of the 123 WPBs and the wholly inadequate 123 WPB logistic support system experienced during their shortened life speak loudly of how the influence of the Deepwater contractor on the G-D APM’s performance related decision points negatively influenced the final delivered performance of these assets.

 

 

With the unilateral G-D surface APM decisions still fresh from the 123 project, in early 2003 many in G-S were openly referring to the NSC as a contract repeat of the 123.  That said, NSC designs issues followed a very similar path to that of the 110/123 WPB extension project in that even before the RFP was issued and the contract awarded to ICGS, G-S IPT elements had a relatively long and critical list of NSC design concerns.  In addition to the current and outstanding structural issues, G-S had concerns with the stern ramp interface and the fact that the original NSC design had no other small boat launch and retrieval system. So significant was this concern that G-S conducted a worldwide survey of existing stern ramp configurations and only after very conclusive findings did the first NSC design get modified for the inclusion of a side launch capability for the Long Range Interceptor (LRI); its unsure if this side launch capability will be incorporated on subsequent NSC designs.

 

Although this particular design issue was a success, the structural issues raged with the NSC IPT members virtually at a standstill for any progress.  With no risk mitigation strategy apparent and no perceived hope of resolution at the NSC IPT level, in accordance with the PMP, this concern was raised to the 0-5 level System Engineering IPT (SEIT) in the early fall of 2002.  As with the NSC IPT, no apparent progress was forthcoming with the SEIT and in the same 2002 timeframe, it was brought officially to the attention to the IIPT.  Note however that all during this tumultuous duration at the lower IPTs, it was a brewing storm that the IIPT was watching and knew was coming.  Likewise with the 123 process, NSC DTOs were scheduled for release to ensure the advertised delivery of NSC 1.  Concurrent with a planned IIPT discussion of the NSC structural issues, a meeting was held with G-S, G-O, the PEO, many of the G-D senior staff and even some ICGS senior member were present when elements of the ELC staff who supported the NSC IPT, formally presented in great detail the basis for their engineering concerns and forecast of future performance problems.  Unfortunately this meeting failed to gain the desired outcome as even in the presence of three Flag officers, the level of distrust and friction that existed between the ELC, G-D and ICGS personnel related to the NSC, compromised any cogent and structured discussion. Subsequent discussions at the IIPT and OIPT also failed to get any resolution, and in spite of G-SDW objections, the DTO to initiate the NSC construction and procurement of NSC Long Lead Time material was awarded.  From this period, a variety of correspondence moved back and forth through the G-S and G-D organizations concerning the NSC structural issues.  At one point, the NSC ICGS representative developed singular one page rebuttals on how each of the structural issues had been resolved to the point they could be mitigated and removed from the G-D maintained and controlled risk data base. In spite of repeated G-D attempts to deemphasize the seriousness of these concerns, they were never mitigated successfully and still exist today. 

 

My transfer from G-SDW to Commanding Officer at the ELC in May 2003 and the arrival of a new SDW and G-S later that summer brought a new strategy in dealing with these apparent irresolvable issues. For all subsequent ELC or G-SDW engineering concerns, an independent analysis and confirmation would be needed. Current documentation and separate DHS IG findings have since provided the results of the many independent studies and validations of the G-S initial concerns. During the time, these independent studies occurred, precious and irretrievable time elapsed, DTOs were awarded and the NSC moved along its advertised schedule. One of the strongest warnings I provided to the IIPT prior to leaving the G-SDW assignment was that with the continued construction process of the NSC, and many of the structural concerns dealing with the hull girder itself, if upon NSC delivery we finally get some resolution to these structural problems, it will be too late for the Coast Guard to economically fix the problems.  Unfortunately, this is exactly where we are today.  Since all these design issues started before any DTO was released, the Coast Guard missed the best time to make the needed design changes to the NSC. In lieu of making the necessary changes while the NSC was still in the “electron mode” and absorb what would have been at best a relatively minor cost increase and possible schedule slippage, we wasted over four years of “opportunity” passing memos back and forth avoiding what was addressed very early on as a critical design flaw. Another example where the Integrator, the actual NSC construction contractor and the G-D staff seemed to align too quickly and conveniently to ensure the schedule was maintained at the expense of performance.

 

 

The FRC became yet another performance problem but not because of any initial concept design in the proposal. Unlike the 123 and the NSC, this design failure came about after it was decided at the very highest levels of the Coast Guard that the hull was to be of a composite material construction.  Almost immediately red flags rose from G-S elements due to the lack of existing hulls of this size with all composite hulls.  Most of the subsequent IPT engagements and exchanges concerning the FRC occurred while I was the ELC Commanding Officer. The Deepwater organization I had at the ELC was led by a very seasoned G-S 15 who coordinated with another GS-15 whose staff of civilian naval architects and engineers completed the engineering analysis of the proposed composite platform.  As a result, I only engaged when the FRC details needed Commanding Officer correspondence signature or influence.  What I can testify to is that the analysis indicated serious and dramatic deviations from any parametric references to similar hull forms.  In addition to the pure naval architecture red flags, there were sustainment and maintenance concerns for a composite hull. With the uniqueness of the hull material fabrication techniques, and the apparent absence of any known large or small shipyard, with the exception of the Gulf coast, to do eventual hull repairs in areas where the FRC would normally operate, major maintenance or repair costs needed to be incorporated in the overall evaluation and eventually mitigated.  Since the decision to pursue a completely different FRC procurement strategy occurred after I left the Coast Guard, I can’t talk with any authority on what really brought about this decision.  That said, I have to believe the repeated and final realization of previous G-S engineering concerns with the 123 and NSC may have finally tipped the balance that maybe it should be the G-S engineers and not the “World Class” shipbuilders that should have the majority vote when it comes to making engineering design decisions.

 

 

Any Deepwater related discussion can’t be made without accounting for the funding and personnel resource constraints. Although both were significant, I still firmly believe that the overall goal of this contract; a complete integration of new surface and air assets with interoperable C4ISR capabilities and an integrated logistic support system spanning the entire spectrum of supply chain management, was possible without the need for a system integrator nor the extravagant and complex Deepwater procurement strategy.  It should be no surprise that I believe compliance with the SAM and its established “healthy” directorate tensions could have worked!

 

 

Concurrent with the award decision, it was already a known problem that funding, both AC&I and non-AC&I accounts, would be in severe jeopardy. The Operational and Support (O&S) CLINS would place great strains on the remainder of the Coast Guard’s operational budget.  G-S elements quickly instituted the practice to “fence off” annual funding supporting Deepwater assets from non-Deepwater assets.  Based on significant annual increases in O&S costs, the amount of money shunted to ICGS to support the new Deepwater assets could easily and relatively quickly require augmentation from the non-Deepwater fleet.

 

Projected AC&I program funds needed to reasonably manage the project were knowing deficient even before the release of the RFP.  Personal conversations I initiated with the most senior contract and management levels of the G-D organization before the release of the RFP identified no accounting for ANY cost growth, needed contract changes or award fees.  When the G-S 10-20 % repair maintenance cost metrics for growth and changes were used as an examples during our discussions, it became quickly apparent to these G-D officials that there was insufficient reserve in the AC&I program’s budget to account for this inescapable reality; there will be contract changes and there will be unexpected growth.  A too simplistic answer of, we’ll live within the budget and fund what we can fund, was linked to, this is a performance contract, and if the contractor doesn’t deliver the specified performance, changes will be their cost to bear, or words to that effect.  When the three industry teams were building proposals to utilize every spare AC&I dollar allowed, this over simplification of a very real funding problem crippled many of the needed asset modifications and resource needs early in the program.  When comparing this reality funding, to the millions of dollars provided to the Integrator, one can’t help but raise obvious questions if the limited AC&I funds are being expended most effectively.

 

 

Personnel resources across all Directorates would be severely strained.  For some reason the early G-ADW and subsequent G-D personnel resource metrics always referred to other acquisition programs and government organizations for a comparison of funds to bodies.  This incorrect metric reference drove virtually all related resource decisions and distributions. At one point, the G-D mandate was that there would be no AC&I Full Time Equivalent (FTE) growth in FY04.  As a result of these types of management and funding induced decisions, personnel shortages were felt across the board!  It was hoped that the Integrator and the strength of the Contractor’s resources would help mitigate this resource capability gap.  As the program was to quickly find out, this did not materialize and as greater program management “oversight” was needed, there were simply not enough resources to cover the needs.  During one point during the initial program buildup, G-S developed a resource presentation that indicated an additional 200 FTE would be needed in G-S alone to provide the expected support directorate roles for the initial “transition” years of the program. This became known as the “Pig in the Snake” presentation because of the analogy of a relatively large mass being accepted and eventually run through the organization. Once the transition period was negotiated, it was expected that the final organization would be smaller because of the ICGS provided engineering, logistic and management support capabilities and efficiencies.&n