President Bush and President Putin are meeting today to discuss historic cuts to the nuclear stockpiles in the U.S. and Russia. For the future of both our nations, and the prospect of a more secure world, I hope they are successful in addressing this legacy of the Cold War. We must not forget another legacy – the materials, facilities, equipment and people used to make these and other weapons.

We have faced a major national security problem since the 1991 break up of the Soviet Union. Control of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapon materials was suddenly spread out among a number of newly independent nations. We could no longer be assured of adequate control of these weapons or the people who had designed them. Prior to 1991, international non-proliferation policy stressed keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of a few states. But ten years ago we were faced with the possibility that the information and materials which would have taken years to acquire to build a WMD weapon could now be stolen in an instant.

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the problem of preventing WMD proliferation has gained both a new urgency and a greater complexity.

The FBI's assessment that the anthrax attacks, which have plagued the Senate and the nation's mail, may have been perpetrated by a lone, disgruntled scientist demonstrates how a weapon that had only been in the hands of a state can now be wielded by a single terrorist.

Weapons that we previously worried about being delivered by an intercontinental ballistic missile we now know can be infiltrated into our midst without any advance warning. We are faced with the prospect of spending billions of dollars to protect our homeland against multiple threats from multiple sources.

Non-proliferation programs, the subject of today's hearing, are a critical means to prevent weapons, materials, equipment and technology from falling into the wrong hands.

U.S. non-proliferation activities deserve credit for a number of significant accomplishments. With American assistance, all nuclear weapons have been removed from the Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. And, non-proliferation activities have extended beyond destruction of launchers and safe storage and disposal of nuclear material to address the recruitment of critical scientists and engineers in the former Soviet nuclear, biological and chemical weapons complex.

But this is only the beginning. The proliferation threats and the legacy of the post-Soviet states' inheritance of WMD, sensitive materials and technologies, and related know-how still exist.

I want to thank our colleague, Senator Hagel, for being here to discuss his proposal to achieve a national strategy and improve coordination between the various non-proliferation programs. His legislation, the Nonproliferation Coordination Assistance Act, would establish a coordinating body to ensure that non-proliferation activities are efficient, effective and further national security interests.

The Departments of State, Defense and Energy have asked that their testimony be postponed until after President Bush's summit with President Putin. We have agreed to this and will reschedule their testimony in the near future.

In our discussion of current and future non-proliferation plans, and the ways to improve and better coordinate them, we must keep in mind two questions. First, how can we adapt to ever changing WMD threats? And second, are our plans and policies making the world more secure?

I look forward to hearing our witnesses' comments on these two questions.