Senator Norm Coleman Voice's His Opposition to Arbitrary Troop Withdrawal Timelines in Supplemental Funding Bill coleman_apr261.ram - 2.4 MBs
IRAQ FLOOR SPEECH April 26, 2007
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I was in Iraq this weekend, and I was there in December, right before Christmas, with my friend, Senator Nelson of Florida. Our meetings at that time took place in the shadows of the 2006 Congressional elections and in the wake of the much anticipated Iraq Study Group report. During each of our visits at that time, the atmosphere exuded a feeling of transition, a desire to get out of the constant struggle of lateral movement to a feeling of longing for a new strategy, long overdue in Iraq. On January 10, we learned the details of that new strategy. It wasn't exactly what many of us expected and it raised some particular concerns for me. Two weeks earlier when I was in Iraq, I met with the National Security Adviser for the Prime Minister of Iraq, Dr. al-Rubaie, and he told Senator Nelson and me he didn't think sectarian violence was the biggest problem in Iraq. To express that kind of denial was incredulous. Senator Nelson and I kind of looked at each other. His comments reflected to me at that time that I didn't think the Iraqi Government had the commitment to reconciliation needed to warrant an increase in U.S. forces in Baghdad and in an area wracked by sectarian civil war.
So at the time I stated the idea of sending an additional force of 20,000 troops into Baghdad, into the lion's den of sectarian violence without any additional commitment from the Iraqi Government was something I did not feel I could support. Because of the duty we share as Members of this deliberative body, I put myself on record expressing my views. I wasn't popular with a lot of my constituents. I joined the senior Senator from Virginia, a colleague whom I respect so deeply on military matters, the former chairman of the Armed Services committee, and I cosponsored his resolution expressing the concern over the proposed surge in Baghdad.
A slightly modified version of his resolution came before the full Senate on February 5, a little over 2 months ago. Although my colleagues in the majority at that time sought to limit our opportunity to amend this legislation through procedural maneuvering, I believed I had a duty to follow my conscience and I supported the procedural motion to move forward on that resolution. I joined many of my colleagues, mostly on the other side of the aisle, in voting for cloture on this resolution on February 5.
Here we are, 2 short months later, and how the debate has changed. I will talk a little bit about what I have seen in Iraq but how the debate has changed. I thought I would take a brief moment to remind some of my colleagues across the aisle what they went on record as supporting on February 5. On February 5, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle said: We respect what S. 470 said, we respect the constitutional authorities given to the President, that the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. Here we are 2 months later making an attempt to limit his constitutional authority to exercise his fundamental constitutional duties.
On February 5, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle said the resolution they supported should not be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction in, or withdrawal of, the present level of forces.
Here we are, 2 short months later, picking an arbitrary withdrawal date without the consent of our commanders on the ground and advocating a pullout.
On February 5, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle stated their belief that ``the U.S. should continue vigorous operations in Anbar province.'' And here we are 2 short months later and we are trying to pull our forces out and leave the Sunnis in Anbar alone to deal with the terror of al-Qaida.
On February 5, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle stated their belief that ``a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to regional and world peace.'' I don't know that many who have studied this issue would disagree with that notion. And here we are 2 short months later essentially working to ensure that this frightening prospect materializes.
On February 5, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle commended our troops in the field, agreeing that they have served our country ``with the bravery and professionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the U.S. Armed Forces.'' But here we are today, reflecting on comments that they have ``lost'' the war in Iraq.
Most importantly, on February 5, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle stated their belief that the U.S. ``should not take any action that will endanger U.S. military forces in the field, including the elimination or reduction of funds for our troops.'' Here we are 2 months later, conditioning that funding on withdrawal timelines to handcuff our military leaders, delaying the delivery of resources our forces need.
One of the things I heard in Anbar Province from a Marine general was that they needed these V-shaped humvee vehicles to protect against IEDs. Regular humvees are flat and they take the full force of a blast. With the use of these V-shaped humvee bottoms, we have not had many casualties. This bill the President will veto has about 8,000 of those V-shaped vehicles that we need.
I supported that resolution in February, but I did not support the bill before us today. It is unfortunate that the majority in this body has decided to utilize this important piece of legislation to attempt to set us on a course for failure in Iraq. When I say that, it is true this bill contains a lot of important things for our military, our veterans. But it is unconscionable that our veterans would be used as pawns in a political game, where the majority seeks to ensure failure in Iraq at all costs. That is what happens when you say it is lost, when you tell the enemy this is when we are withdrawing. I think our soldiers and our families deserve better.
My recent trip to Iraq underscored the fact that while we face formidable challenges, there are also glimmers of hope. General Petraeus said that to me in Baghdad on Saturday. He showed me the charts of the declines in the death squads and sectarian violence in Baghdad. He talks about the sheiks in Anbar Province coming over and fighting shoulder to shoulder with us against al-Qaida in Iraq.
When I visited Iraq this weekend, I traveled to Taqaddum in Anbar Province, between Fallujah and Ramadi, and Talil, in south central Iraq. I also spent time in Baghdad. We have some Minnesota National Guard in Talil and Taqaddum. We have a long way to go. It is certainly too early to tell whether our new strategy, including the surge in troops, is succeeding at the level set out by the President. Even General Petraeus has said that. Certainly our headlines here at home still echo the horrific suicide bombs and insurgent attacks we have sadly grown to expect when we read the morning paper. This is an enemy with resolve. It understands the impact of those actions on the American people.
General Petraeus told me and others in this body that he will come back to us in September--his troops are not all deployed at this point in time--and he can show the progress and the decline in the killings and sectarian violence. He talked about the elimination of some of the killing cells and some of their leadership. He will come back in September with the Ambassador, whom I also had dinner with that night, to discuss the situation. They will tell us whether they have succeeded in providing the stability in Baghdad that will allow the process of reconciliation to move forward more aggressively. He used the phrase many times that ``the clock in Washington ticks much faster than in Iraq.'' We know that. He did say military action cannot win this war. But my colleagues on the other side, when they quote that, don't quote the other half of the sentence. He said it is 20 percent military action, but you cannot do the other 80 percent unless you are successful in the military action. He is clear about that. I believe General Petraeus and the troops he commands deserve to be given the time they need before we arbitrarily decide the war is lost.
I continue to have my doubts about the Iraqi leadership. I met with the Prime Minister of Iraq, and he told me he was annoyed by a statement by the Secretary of Defense regarding the need to bring Sunnis more into their Government. His comment was that the Shia is a majority and it would undermine the democracy, tell the majority what they have to do. I said: Respectfully, I serve in the Senate. In the Senate, we protect in this country against one of the enemies of democracy, which is the tyranny of the majority. That is what has to go into the reconciliation in Iraq. I don't believe, as I listened to him, that he has the kind of commitment yet we need to make reconciliation successful. So that is of concern.
For us in this body, it is hard to think that giving a voice to the minority would constitute undermining democracy. We know the perils of a tyranny of the majority, which Alexis de Tocqueville defined in 1835, and that Madison and Hamilton alluded to in the Federalist Papers. The fact we are still trying to persuade the Prime Minister that he has to do a better job of reaching out to his own countrymen makes it hard for me to be optimistic.
Despite these challenges, the atmosphere in my meetings last weekend was so different than what I saw in December. The brave American civilians who are executing the diplomatic components of our strategy have a new sense of mission. I met with State Department folks--two of them--at breakfast Saturday morning. They are part of the new PRT. They are about to go Anbar Province, and they are reading in the paper that the war is ``lost'' and they are going out into Anbar Province to work on the reconstruction of Anbar and Fallujah. They are just about to begin their mission with a sense of hope, and shame on us if we dash it here. Some of the Iraqi leaders I was with reacted strongly in an opposite direction from the Prime Minister and clearly understood our commitment is not open-ended. Certainly, the courageous men and women in the field told me to relay to my colleagues this war is not lost. Let me be very clear. I sat in meetings with members of the Minnesota National Guard--by the way, I am unhappy about their tours of duty being extended. They and their families heard in the press that they were being extended. I complained about that to the Army and received an apology. In spite of that, they stood up and said to me: Use our names. Tell the Senate the war is not lost.
MAJ Brian Melton, from Moorhead, MN, said: Tell the Senate the war is not lost. Lieutenant Martin of the Ð1/34th Support Battalion in Talil, Iraq, wants the Senate to know the war is not lost. These soldiers talked about at one point it being kind of the Wild West in Anbar Province and it is being transformed.
I wish my colleagues would have heard the story from LTC Gregg Parks of Walker, MN. He told me about a suicide bomber who came into a town called Habbaniyah, and he veered into a crowd coming out of a mosque, blew himself up, and wounded or killed many Iraqis. Not a single American shed blood in that attack; yet our soldiers lined up to give blood. The next day, the mayor and local sheiks came in and gave the names of al-Qaida operatives and pledged to work side by side with our troops to drive al-Qaida out of Iraq. I wish my colleagues could have heard COL David Elicerio, commander of the 1/34 Brigade Combat Team of the Minnesota National Guard. He told me about the ``adopt a highway'' program his men and women have implemented with the local Iraqis. He said the local sheiks came in and identified where there were two IEDs.
There are many challenges that lie ahead, probably too many to name here. I don't see the situation in Iraq through rose-colored glasses and I am not trying to paint an unrealistic picture. The violence we have see over the past weeks in places like Baqubah reminds us all too well of the struggles we face.
I know the American public has run out of patience on this war. I don't know what the next round of letters to the editor will look like, or the attack ads on moveon.org for the vote I cast; but I am committed to stemming the flow of terrorism, not handing al-Qaida a victory they will be able to use to strengthen their forces and hurt and kill more Americans.
This bill we passed, with the timeline for surrender, doesn't make America safer. I am not for an open-ended commitment or a blank check, but as General Petraeus has said, you have to have a plan B. If the Iraqis don't do what they need to do for reconciliation, we are going to figure out a way to get Americans out of the crosshairs of that civil war. Some say we will be in Kuwait or some other area. General Petraeus told me he has to refuel his helicopters three times to get back into Baghdad, and if there is a ``Rwanda'' in Baghdad, we are not going to be able to do anything about it. We will redeploy our troops if this surge doesn't work, put them outside the center area.
In the end, they may have to look at a plan B. But that decision will come soon. General Petraeus said: Let me come back in September. Perhaps that is not soon enough for the American public, but the decision we made today, the statement that the war is ``lost,'' the decision to set into place a timetable for surrender, doesn't help us provide an opportunity for reconciliation to occur in Iraq, or for there to be greater stability in the region, and it will let al-Qaida have a victory. A timetable for surrender hurts our warriors on the front line. It is a path I could not follow, one America shall not follow. Let us come back with a different supplemental and let us give our warriors the money they need to fight the war that has to be fought. Let us do that quickly.
I yield the floor.
Senator Norm Coleman Floor Speech on Iraq coleman_jan10.ram - 13.4 MBs
IRAQ FLOOR SPEECH January 10, 2007
Mr. President, having recently returned from another visit to Iraq serving as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I come to the floor this afternoon to express my views on the most pressing issue facing our country today: our path to success in Iraq. The Iraq Study Group recently stated the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. When the current path isn't working, you have to be flexible. You have to shift. You have to make a change. And, clearly, in Iraq today we have to make a change. The President of the United States, on Friday, said the same thing.
In December I met with Iraqi political leaders, U.S. troops and their leaders, as well as our diplomats on the ground. Our conversations with this broad range of individuals helped me draw various conclusions that are key to evaluating the proposals currently being debated. In light of the President's upcoming announcement of his strategy for Iraq, I think it is important to share these conclusions.
It is easy to lose sight of the fact that we are in Iraq as part of a Global War on Terror. There is no question that Iraq has become the key battleground of this war. Failure cannot be an option in either the overall war on terror or in Iraq. As the President has correctly stated, this is the battle of this generation. With menacing regimes in Iran and Syria, we cannot dismiss the fact that a failed state in Iraq would lead to much more than chaos and collapse in that nation. It would destabilize a critical region of the world and, most alarmingly, would create a breeding ground for terrorists whose ambitions do not stop at Iraq's borders. Americans--all Americans--have a direct stake in winning this war.
We know the United States will be involved in the war on terror for the foreseeable future. The question is, How do we move forward in Iraq? How do we fight this war? And, where do we put our troops?
From my experience in Iraq, I know now, or at least I believe, that we are fighting it essentially on two fronts. The first is the war we intended to fight: a war against terrorists, primarily Sunni extremists and foreign jihadists linked to al-Qaida--foreign terrorists. The other war is a war between the Iraqis themselves: Shiite against Sunni, in a seemingly endless cycle of grisly violence. Our military must continue the battle against extremists and terrorists, but we have no business being caught in the crossfires of an Iraqi sectarian conflict.
The good news is we have had great success in fighting the war on terror, imposing crippling losses on the international jihadist network which today operates in Iraq. Indeed, during my visit in December with marines from Minnesota stationed in Anbar, they reported they were making great headway against the insurgency there. I am proud of their accomplishments, and I firmly believe these military victories directly enhance our security at home. But to secure the ground that these marines have cleared of insurgents in places such as Fallujah, they need Sunni police officers. They need Sunni members of the Iraqi Army. They need reconciliation between Sunni and Shia. So as we continue to fight the first war, the war against terrorists, we need also to address the second war, that of Iraqi against Iraqi.
The overall consensus I found in Iraq is that we will be unable to hold on to the ground we have gained on the first front without addressing the second front: Iraqi sectarian violence. This violence is spiraling rapidly and is undermining the success we have made against the terrorists. If the Iraqi security forces, both Army and police, are to someday soon take over the fighting of the insurgency from U.S. troops, it is clear that intergroup violence must be brought under control. The Iraqi security forces must include all Iraqis: Sunni, Shiite, Kurd, and others. To be certain, our efforts cannot succeed if sectarian hatred is not addressed at the highest level of the Iraqi Government immediately.
The only long-term solution for bringing stability to Iraq must be centered on national reconciliation. It is true that after decades of Sunni violence led by Saddam Hussein and his regime, the Shiites still have unaddressed grievances. But this does not call for, nor permit, neighborhood-by-neighborhood ethnic cleansing, nor a refusal to work together for the future of all Iraqis. Shiites may be able to win short-term victories through the use of violence, but in the long term they will not have a unified country if they continue to do so. Iraqi leaders should focus on reining in all sectarian groups under the umbrella of a national and inclusive political process. This is a solution that can only be led by the Iraqis themselves.
With no doubt, this sectarian violence was left to grow unchecked for far too long. Even so, it is not too late to get Iraq back to stable footing. But it will come from dialogue and political compromise enforced by a central government prepared to take on militias under the control of religious sects, clans, and even common criminals. We must get to the point where Iraqi citizens express their views through political channels instead of through violence. The Iraqis are the masters of their own destiny, and it is important that our strategy regard them as such.
Since my trip to Iraq in December, I have been calling for the Iraqi Government to establish a series of benchmarks that will diffuse the sectarian violence and stabilize the country politically and economically. These benchmarks would include an oil revenue-sharing agreement and economic assistance to areas that have been neglected in the past. The reality is not putting resources in Anbar Province because it is Sunni, and so as a result, what you get is a feeding of insurgency by the actions of a government that has not been prepared to address the issue of sectarian violence. We will be a better supporter of the Iraqi Government if we pressure them to create and adhere to these benchmarks rather than assuming that this fractured Government will take this on by themselves. I fear that up to this point the Iraqi leadership has not stepped up to the plate to make the difficult decisions that are necessary to pave the road for a political solution.
When I was in Iraq with Senator Bill Nelson from Florida, we met with the Iraqi National Security Adviser to Maliki, Dr. Rubaie, who contended that sectarian violence wasn't the main problem, but the problem was the foreign terrorists and was the Sunni insurgency. That is not the case. As a Senator responsible for looking after the best interests of my constituents and all Americans, I take seriously the responsibility of Iraqi political leaders to honor the sacrifices that are being made by American soldiers. I refuse to put more American lives on the line in Baghdad without being assured that the Iraqis themselves are willing to do what they need to do to end the violence of Iraqi against Iraqi. If Iraq is to fulfill its role as a sovereign and democratic state, it must start acting like one. It is for this reason that I oppose the proposal for a troop surge. I oppose the proposal for a troop surge in Baghdad where violence can only be defined as sectarian. A troop surge proposal basically ignores the conditions on the ground, both as I saw on my most recent trip and reports that I have been receiving regularly since my return. My consultations with both military and Iraqi political leaders confirms that an increase in troops in areas plagued by sectarian violence will not solve the problem of sectarian hatred. A troop surge in Baghdad would put more American troops at risk to address a problem that is not a military problem. It will put more American soldiers in the crosshairs of sectarian violence. It will create more targets. I just don't believe that makes sense.
Again, I oppose a troop surge in Baghdad because I don't believe it is the path to victory or a strategy for victory in Iraq. I recognize there are those who think otherwise. The Iraqi Study Group, in their report, said that they could, however, support a short-term deployment, a surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad or to speed up the training and equipping mission if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such standards would be effective.
I sat with the President with Democratic colleagues and Republican colleagues. I know that he has weighed this heavily, and I know he has looked at this issue for a long time. Apparently, he has come to the conclusion that, in fact, a troop surge would be helpful. I believe his comments will contain--hopefully contain--discussions about benchmarks and contain a commitment to do those things to rebuild the economy and create jobs so that we get rid of some of the underlying causes and frustrations that feed the insurgency. But the bottom line is, again, at this point in time, it is sectarian violence that I believe is the major issue that we face and more troops in Baghdad is not going to solve that problem.
As one of the final conclusions to share of my experience in Iraq, I would also like to emphasize the significant role of Iran in fomenting instabilities. Across the board, my meetings with Iraqi officials revealed that the Iranians are driving instability in Iraq by all means at their disposal. We had a hearing today in the Foreign Relations Committee and one of the speakers, one of the experts said that it may be, and it is probably clear that, the Iranians have a stake in American failure in Iraq and its stability in the region, and they feed on that. Indeed, there are credible reports that Iran is currently supplying money and weapons to both its traditional Shiite allies and its historic Sunni rivals, all for the purposes of ensuring a daily death toll of Iraqi citizens. It is clear the Iranians have concluded that chaos in Iraq is in their direct interest. Iran's role thus far, not to mention their pursuit of nuclear weapons, makes it hard to believe that they might suddenly become a constructive partner in the stabilization of Iraq.
I want to point out that my commitment to success in Iraq has not changed, nor my willingness to consider options that would realistically contribute toward our goals there. In my trips to Iraq, I have gone with an open mind as to what next steps could be taken as we work with the Iraqis to stabilize their country. I have said all along that the stakes of our mission in Iraq are such that failure is simply not an option, and I will only support proposals that will steer the United States toward victory. Abandoning Iraq today would precipitate an even greater surge of ethnic cleansing. It would, as I indicated before, precipitate an episode of instability and chaos in the region that would be in no one's interest. But my most recent trip to Iraq also reaffirmed to me that it is the Iraqis who must play the biggest role in any strategy for success. Our investment must be tied to their willingness to make the tough choices needed to pave the way to stability and for them to act on them.
I represent Minnesota, but if I represented Missouri, I think I would simply say to Maliki: Show me. Show me your resolve. Show me your commitment. Show me that you can, in fact, do the things that have to be done to deal with the sectarian violence, and then we can talk about enhancing and increasing the American effort. I haven't seen it. I don't see it today, and as such, I am certainly not willing to put more U.S. troops at risk.
Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I note the absence of a quorum