Statement of Congressman John D. Dingell, Chairman
Committee on Energy and Commerce

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing entitled, “The Recent Salmonella Outbreak: Lessons Learned and Consequences to Industry and Public Health.”

July 31, 2008

I thank the Subcommittee Chairman for holding this hearing; our ninth on the safety and security of the Nation’s food supply. Today’s hearing will examine yet another major food contamination outbreak, Salmonella Saintpaul, which has again shaken public confidence and devastated an important industry.

Since April, at least 1,304 people in 43 States, the District of Columbia, and Canada have been infected with Salmonella Saintpaul. These illnesses resulted in at least 252 hospitalizations and contributed to at least two deaths. This is one of the largest outbreaks of Salmonella in the United States and, based on the number of confirmed cases, the largest foodborne outbreak in the last ten years.

While it has caused personal and financial tragedy to many, this outbreak should also be another wake-up call that our system for responding to unintentional or intentional contamination of the Nation’s food supply is broken. For example, our investigation has uncovered:

• A breakdown in the way the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) shared critical data with key State agencies;
• The failure of the FDA and CDC to leverage State resources; and
  
• More than 3,000 State and local health departments working without coordinating with each other or the Federal government, and with limited resources, serving as the first line of defense in identifying an outbreak.
  

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we will hear that key sections of the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 — which were designed to ensure the rapid traceability of food in a situation such as this — failed to perform as intended.

This Act directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to issue specific record-keeping requirements to allow Federal investigators to quickly respond to threats on our food supply.

We have learned, however, that key portions of this Act — designed to allow for rapid traceability — don’t work. While the FDA was ultimately able to trace commodities associated with this outbreak, the process was slow and cumbersome. Consequently, what should have taken hours or days has taken months.

Today, we must not only explore the failures of the FDA and CDC, but also what industry can and should do to improve traceability of its products. While some in the FDA have argued that loose produce, like tomatoes, are too difficult to trace, some of our industry witnesses will describe systems currently in place that rapidly trace their products.

We can and must learn from industry. Rather than be at odds with good Government and improved safety, they should be our partners. If parts of the tomato industry can develop an efficient traceability system, why can’t other parts of the food industry do likewise? Why can’t the FDA mandate it, if industry will not voluntarily adopt it? Perhaps it is time to revisit what additional changes to existing regulations may be required to achieve this goal.

We have a number of outstanding witnesses today. I thank them for coming and look forward to hearing their views on what needs to be done to prevent another debacle. With their help, I believe we can restore public confidence in the safety of our food supply and the regulatory agencies most responsible for protecting it.