

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

JOINT STATEMENT OF

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**DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
(COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION)**

AND

**DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
(PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES)**

AND

**COMMANDER
MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND**

BEFORE THE

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES**

CONCERNING

2009 PROCUREMENT AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

ON

FEBRUARY 27, 2008

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Chairman Taylor, Congressman Bartlett and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it is our privilege to report to you on Fiscal Year 2009 Procurement and Research and Development program requests.

I. Introduction

We know the future will be challenging—not only in the immediate conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in subsequent campaigns of the Long War on Terror. This is a multi-faceted, generational struggle that will not be won in one battle, in one country, or by one method. Many of the underlying causes of the current conflict will persist in the coming decades and may be exacerbated by states and transnational actors who are unwilling or unable to integrate into the global community. In this environment, the Marine Corps must be able to adapt to broad strategic conditions and wide-ranging threats. We remain faithful to our enduring and legislated mission — to be wherever, whenever our country needs us and to prevail over whatever challenges we face. We have done this, and will continue to do so, by recruiting and retaining the best of our Nation’s sons and daughters, training them in tough, realistic scenarios, educating them broadly to be intellectually prepared, and providing them the best leadership and equipment available. We are confident that with your continued support, your Corps will remain the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness and continue to fulfill our national security imperative of *being the most ready when the Nation is least ready*.

II. Provide our Nation a naval force that is fully prepared for employment as a Marine Air Ground Task Force across the spectrum of conflict

The newly published Maritime Strategy reaffirms our naval character and reemphasizes our enduring relationship with the Navy and, now, the Coast Guard. Current operations limit our ability to aggressively commit forces to strategy implementation at this time. However, as we increase our end-strength to 202,000 Marines and as security conditions continue to improve in Iraq, the Marine Corps will transition our forces to other battles in the Long War. The Maritime Strategy notes that, “Our ability to overcome challenges to access and to project and sustain power ashore is the basis of our combat credibility.” Our means of projecting power is the Congressionally-mandated mission of amphibious forcible entry, which also has applications in countering terrorism as well as in major combat operations. Such an operation requires a high

level of proficiency and long-term resourcing and is not a capability we can create on short notice.

Today, information moves almost instantaneously around the world via cyberspace, and while people may quickly travel great distances by air, the preponderance of materiel still moves the way it has for millennia—by sea. Whenever the United States has responded to conflict around the globe, the vast majority of United States joint forces, their equipment, and supplies have been transported by sea.

For previous generations, projecting military forces and the resources necessary to support and sustain them overseas was a hazardous undertaking. Adversaries applying their own naval power sought to deny the oceans' crossing or, failing that, landing on the far shore. In the first half of the 20th Century, demonstrating considerable foresight and innovation, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps leaders developed the capabilities necessary to establish sea control and project power ashore where and when desired. In the latter half of the same century the importance of these capabilities waned, as the United States enjoyed the luxury of extensive basing rights overseas, to include secure ports and airfields.

In recent years this network of overseas bases has been dramatically reduced, even as we are confronted by a variety of strategic challenges and are locked in a global struggle for influence. The ability to overcome political, geographic, and military challenges to access has re-emerged as a critical necessity for protecting vital interests overseas. Fortunately, the United States possesses an asymmetric advantage in that endeavor: seapower. Our ability to cross wide expanses of ocean and to remain persistently offshore at a time and place of our choosing is a significant national capability. This means that the Navy-Marine Team can use the sea as both maneuver space and as a secure operating area to overcome impediments to access.

Seabasing

The approach for overcoming these impediments is called *Seabasing*. The Joint Seabasing concept—particularly when using aircraft carriers and amphibious ships with embarked Marines—mitigates the reliance on ports and airfields in the area of operations. It is the ideal method for projecting influence and power ashore in a selectively discrete or overt manner — from conducting security cooperation activities, to providing humanitarian assistance, to deterring and, when necessary, supporting major combat operations.

The seabasing capability currently employed by the Navy-Marine Corps team, however, is limited in its ability to support large joint operations. The sealift transporting the preponderance of the joint force's materiel is still dependent upon secure ports and airfields in a potential operating area. Recognizing the importance of seabasing to 21st Century needs, the Navy and Marine Corps evolved a robust body of conceptual work and, with other joint partners, produced a *Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept*. This concept defines Joint Seabasing as "the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area. These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea."

Just as the amphibious innovations championed by the Navy-Marine Corps during the 1920s and 1930s benefited the entire joint and allied force in World War II, the Navy-Marine Corps seabasing initiatives currently underway are expanding into more comprehensive joint and interagency endeavors. The ability to conduct at-sea transfer of resources, for both ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore purposes, has emerged as a key enabler for deploying, employing, and sustaining joint forces from the sea. Building upon the cornerstones provided by amphibious ships and aircraft carriers, initiatives include developing high-speed intra-theater connectors, surface connectors and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)). These initiatives —as well as others yet to be envisioned — will be employed in combination to achieve an increasingly robust capability to reduce the joint force's reliance on ports and airfields in the objective area.

Together, the Navy and Marine Corps provide the Nation with its capability to rapidly project and sustain combat power ashore in the face of armed opposition. When access is denied or in jeopardy, forward-postured and rapidly deployable Marine forces are trained and ready to create and exploit seams in an enemy's defenses by leveraging available joint and naval capabilities, projecting sustainable combat power ashore, and securing entry for follow-on forces. The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the Nation's premier forcible entry force. Per Strategic Planning Guidance of 2006, two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) provide the assault echelon that fights from amphibious ships. These forces launch from over the horizon to strike inland objectives and fracture the enemy's defenses. They are reinforced by a brigade of

combat power employed by MPF(F). Collectively, these capabilities also provide an ability to respond to crisis across the spectrum of operations without reliance on infrastructure or basing ashore.

In recent years our amphibious and prepositioned capabilities have been in high demand across the spectrum of operations, enabling over eighty-five commitments since the end of the Cold War and doubling the rate at which they were employed during that superpower stand-off. Considering this demonstrated utility, the modest investment of thirty-four amphibious ships and MPF(F) is not too much of an investment to secure the United States from direct attack; ensure strategic access and retain global freedom of action; strengthen existing and emerging alliances and partnerships; and establish favorable security conditions.

III. Shipbuilding Requirements

Based on strategic guidance, in the last several years we have accepted risk in our Nation's forcible entry capacity and reduced amphibious lift from 3.0 MEB assault echelon (AE) to 2.0 MEB AE. In the budgetary arena, the value of amphibious ships is too often assessed exclusively in terms of forcible entry — discounting their demonstrated usefulness across the range of operations and the clear imperative for Marines embarked aboard amphibious ships to meet Phase 0 demands. The ability to transition between those two strategic goalposts, and to respond to every mission-tasking in between, will rely on a strong Navy-Marine Corps Team and the amphibious ships that cement our bond. The Navy and Marine Corps have worked diligently to determine the minimum number of amphibious ships necessary to satisfy the Nation's needs — and look forward to working with the Committee to support the Chief of Naval Operation's (CNO) shipbuilding plans.

As previously discussed, the Marine Corps' contribution to the Nation's forcible entry requirement is a single, simultaneously-employed two MEB assault capability — as part of a seabased MEF. Although not a part of the MEF AE, a third reinforcing MEB is required and will be provided with MPF(F) capabilities. Each MEB AE requires seventeen amphibious warfare ships — resulting in an overall ship requirement for thirty-four amphibious warfare ships. However, given current fiscal constraints, *the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to assume a degree of operational risk by limiting the assault echelon of each MEB by using only fifteen ships*

per MEB — in other words, a Battle Force that provides thirty operationally available amphibious warfare ships.

Amphibious Ship Requirements

In that thirty-ship Battle Force, ten aviation-capable big deck ships (LHA / LHD / LHA(R)), ten LPD 17 class ships, and ten LSD class ships are required to accommodate the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) capabilities. In order to meet a thirty-ship availability rate — based on a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)-approved maintenance factor of ten percent — a minimum of eleven ships of each of the current types of amphibious ships are required — for a total of thirty-three ships. The CNO has concurred with this requirement for thirty-three amphibious warfare ships, which provide the “backbone” of our maritime capability — giving us the ability to meet the demands of harsh environments across the spectrum of conflict.

The legacy *Tarawa* class amphibious assault ships reach the end of their service life during 2011-2015. The eighth *Wasp* class LHD is under construction and will replace one *Tarawa* class ship during Fiscal Year 2008. We are investigating the feasibility of incorporating the reduced island concept and well-deck capabilities in future, big-deck, general-purpose assault ship construction.

The LPD 17 *San Antonio* class of amphibious warfare ships represents the Department of the Navy's commitment to a modern expeditionary power projection fleet that will enable our naval force to operate across the spectrum of warfare. The LPD 17 class replaces four classes of older ships — LKA, LST, LSD 36, LPD 4 — and will have a forty-year expected service life. It is imperative that eleven of these ships be built to meet the minimum of ten necessary for the 2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift requirement. Procurement of the tenth LPD remains a priority.

Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Requirements

Capable of supporting the rapid deployment of three MEBs, MPF is a proven capability and has been used as a force deployment option in selected contingencies, to close forces on accelerated timelines for major combat operations, and in combination with amphibious forces to rapidly and simultaneously react to crises in more than one theater.

The next and necessary evolution of this program is incorporation of the MPF-(Future) (MPF(F)) Squadron into the existing program. MPF(F) is a key enabler for Seabasing and will build on the success of the legacy MPF program. It will provide support to a wide range of military

operations with improved capabilities such as at-sea arrival and assembly, selective offload of specific mission sets, and long-term, sea-based sustainment. From the sea base, the squadron will be capable of prepositioning a single MEB's critical equipment and sustainment for delivery offshore — essentially creating a port and airfield at sea. While the MPF(F) is not suitable for forcible entry operations, it is critical for the rapid build up and sustainment of additional combat forces once our entry has been achieved by our AE — launched from amphibious assault ships. The MPF(F), along with two legacy MPF squadrons, will give the Marine Corps the capacity to quickly generate three MEBs in support of multiple Combatant Commanders. The MPF(F) squadron composition decision was made in May 2005. That squadron is designed to consist of three aviation-capable big-deck ships, three large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships, three T-AKE supply ships, three Mobile Landing Platforms, and two dense-packed container ships. All of these will be crewed by civilian mariners and, as stated earlier, are not designed to conduct forcible entry operations.

Ship Modernization

Amphibious and maritime prepositioning ship modernization is vital to maintaining our Nation's maritime forward presence and expeditionary capabilities. Two decades of equipment growth and recent armor initiatives have impacted the capability and capacity of our present amphibious and maritime prepositioning ship fleets that were designed to lift an early 1980's Naval force. We are monitoring the Navy's progress in upgrading and extending the service lives of our big-deck amphibious assault support ships to ensure those vessels are uniformly outfitted with up to date seabased communications and network capabilities, and will compensate for increased weight and density of Marine Corps assets as a result of armoring initiatives. We must ensure that the dock landing ship fleet is recapitalized to accommodate 21st Century Marine Corps forces. Moreover, we are actively working with the Navy to incorporate newer, more flexible ship platforms from the existing Military Sealift Command fleet into our aging Maritime Prepositioning Ships program. As we reset those ships, such changes are necessary to ensure future afloat prepositioning platforms can accommodate our updated tables of equipment and sustainment support requirements.

IV. Grow the Force.

To meet the demands of the Long War, as well as to prepare for other contingencies for which the MAGTF is uniquely capable, our Corps must be sufficiently manned, well trained, and properly equipped. Like the Cold War, the Long War is a long-term struggle that will not be measured by the number of near-term deployments or rotations; it is this long-term view that informs our priorities and plan for growth. To fulfill our obligations to the Nation, the Marine Corps will grow its personnel end strength to 202,000 Active Component Marines. This increase will enable your Corps to train to the full spectrum of military operations and improve our ability to address future challenges of an uncertain environment. Our force structure development has been the result of a thorough and ongoing process that supports the Combatant Commanders and accomplishes our Title X responsibilities. The process addresses all pillars of combat development (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities) and identifies our required capabilities and the issues associated with fielding them. We are front-loading structure for recruiters and trainers to support our personnel growth and a phased introduction of units balanced across the MAGTF. The increase in capacity will be gradual, as we stand up new units and add end strength through Fiscal Year 2011, but also as we grow mid-grade enlisted and officer leadership — a vital part of our growth that cannot be developed overnight. The additional end strength will result in three MEFs — balanced in capacity and capability.

While end strength growth will help relieve the current strain on our Marines, we must ensure that our personnel policies, organizational construct, and training enable our Marines to operate at a sustainable rate. Our growth to 202,000 Marines will significantly enhance our ability to increase dwell time, maintain adequate equipment for training, while providing our Marines and their families with the necessary resources to sustain their efforts over time. As we grow, we will develop all the elements of our MAGTF in a balanced manner to meet the diverse challenges of an uncertain future. In addition to personnel, this growth includes adequate expansions of our infrastructure to provide suitable housing and support facilities and the right mix of equipment for the current and future fight.

Growing to 202K: Marines

In Fiscal Year 2007, we stood up two infantry battalions: 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines. We also added capacity to our combat engineer battalions and air naval gunfire liaison companies. Our plan will gradually improve the deployment-to-dwell ratio of some of our other habitually high operational tempo units — such as military police, unmanned aerial vehicle, helicopter, air command and control, combat service support, and explosive ordnance disposal units. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2008, we will systematically add approximately 5000 Marines per year resulting in attainment of our ultimate goal of 202,000 by Fiscal Year 2011. While the initial seed funding for the growth in 2007 was funded by supplemental appropriation, the growth in Fiscal Year 2009 is financed in our baseline budget. For Fiscal Years 2009-2013, all of the funding required to house, train, equip and sustain the “right sized” Corps of the future is addressed in our baseline budget. As this is a permanent change to our endstrength we will need continued Congressional support for our baseline budget request to sustain this force.

Growing to 202K: Equipment

Our assessment of the materiel requirements for our growth has been significantly enhanced through cooperation between the Marine Corps and industry partners. Through this effort, and redistribution of some of our strategic stocks, the units we created in Fiscal Year 2007 were provided the equipment necessary to enter their pre-deployment training cycle. With Congress’ continued support, the numerous equipment contracts required to support our growth were met during Fiscal Year 2007 and will be met through Fiscal Year 2008 and beyond. It should be noted that near term exigencies to stand up/equip new units require diversion of procured assets. It will take three to four years to work through this challenge and return total force equipment readiness to the levels which preceded Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF).

MAGTF Table of Equipment Review As a result of the changing security environment and lessons learned by operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, many of our unit Tables of Equipment (T/E) have experienced major adjustments and do not necessarily reflect the way we intend to fight in the future. Consequently, the Commandant recently directed a comprehensive Marine Corps-wide MAGTF T/E review. The initial review is complete and the Approved Acquisition

Objective (AAO) validation is underway. It supports enhanced mobility, lethality, and command and control across a dispersed battlefield for the entire operating force and will ensure that our Marine Corps remain a 'two-fisted' force capable of meeting future traditional and irregular warfighting requirements.

Individual Marines are and will remain our most vital asset. The Commandant's top funding priority, reflected in the Fiscal Year 2009 President's Budget, is to meet the demands of the Long War by ensuring that we *Grow the Force*. This entails more than recruiting and retaining the necessary manpower to meet current and future operational needs, the plan must also ensure our Marines are properly trained, housed, and equipped with the new technologies and capabilities that increase battlefield effectiveness and save lives. We are ahead of schedule to achieve our *Grow the Force* active component end-strength increase to 189,000 Marines in Fiscal Year 2008 and 194,000 in Fiscal Year 2009, with the goal of reaching 202,000 Marines no later than Fiscal Year 2011. This increase will enable us to resume training to the full spectrum of military operations, results in a balanced three MEF capability, and improves our ability to address future challenges of an uncertain environment. Furthermore, our *Grow the Force* initiative enables us to reduce deployment-to-dwell times and regain our ability to respond to Combatant Commander demands, thereby reducing operational risk, improving response times, and limiting the human and materiel costs of lowered readiness.

V. Modernizing our Marine Corps

Our Fiscal Year 2009 Procurement, Marine Corps baseline request is \$1.5 billion, down from \$2.3 billion enacted in Fiscal Year 2008. The principal reason for that decline is that our Fiscal Year 2008 request included an investment of approximately \$1.1 billion to procure the equipment necessary to stand up the units associated with our *Grow the Force* initiative. As new units stand up it is imperative that we have sufficient equipment on-hand for those units to begin the training necessary to ready them for future deployments. With production leadtimes as long as twenty-four to thirty-six months for some of our principal end items, we needed to procure equipment in 2008 in order for deliveries to support unit initial operating capability dates in 2010-2011. There remains a residual PMC request of \$184 million in Fiscal Year 2009 and subsequent requirements in the outyears to complete procurement of equipment for the *Grow the*

Force unit stand-ups. The outyear budgets will continue to reflect sustainment and periodic equipment refresh costs required to maintain equipment availability.

Urgent Warfighting Requirements

Designed to procure equipment for commanders more expediently than if submitted through the traditional acquisition process, our Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS) process uses a secure, web-based system that provides full stakeholder visibility from submission through resolution. Through continuous process improvement, and a Lean Six Sigma review, we have reduced average processing time from 142 to 83.2 days and transitioned over fifty emerging capabilities into programs of record. Typically, UUNS are funded by reprogramming funds from approved programs or through Congressional supplemental funding until we can transition them through the next budgeting cycle. We continue to review the system for opportunities to increase efficiency and timeliness in order to deliver much needed capability to the warfighter as swiftly as possible.

Fiscal Year 2009 Ground Procurement

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles MRAP vehicles continue to provide our forces the best currently-available protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and mines. Based on evolving threats, operational requirements, feedback from commanders in the field and our commitment to being “good stewards” of taxpayers’ money, the Marine Corps requirement has been revalidated to 2,225 and is pending approval of the Joint Readiness Oversight Committee. Over 900 MRAPs are currently in service with Central Command Marine Corps units. This could not have been achieved without the support of Congress and the dedication of all involved with this unprecedented acquisition effort.

Logistics Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR) The LVSR will replace the current LVS five variant fleet with three variants — cargo, tractor and wrecker. The cargo variant will transport bulk liquids; ammunition; bulk, breakbulk and palletized cargo; and tactical bridging equipment. The tractor will tow heavy engineer equipment and combat vehicles, and the wrecker will perform heavy wrecker/recovery missions for all tactical wheeled vehicles. The LVSR, along with the fielded Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR), will share a comprehensive logistics network, some common parts and similar maintenance training, allowing streamlined

maintenance and support. It is designed with an integral ballistic cab floor and a removable add-on armor "B" kit to protect crews from blast, IEDs, and small arms fire. The B kit consists of opaque armor and transparent armor components providing an increased level of ballistic protection. The LVSR fleet will be able to mount a wide range of defensive weaponry, to include a weapon station, gunner's restraint system, and the Marine Corps Transparent Armored Gunner's Shield. The cargo variant full rate production decision is scheduled for October 2008, while the tractor and wrecker variants will request a Milestone C decision to enter into low rate production during the first quarter Fiscal Year 2009.

Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) and MTVR Armor System (MAS) MTVR vehicles with the MAS have been fully developed, tested and are being fielded. The system has been combat proven in Iraq since March 2005. MAS provides fully integrated, 360 degree, crew compartment armor protection, and an optional MTVR armored troop carrier. These vehicles are also being upgraded with an improved blast protection package consisting of blast attenuating seats, five-point restraint harnesses, and improved belly and wheel-well blast deflectors. The MAS has been installed on all Marine Corps' MTVRs in Central Command. Along with the improved blast protection upgrade, we are installing a reduced fuel fire fuel tank protection kit, and 300 AMP alternators; target upgrade completion for in-theater vehicles is fourth quarter Fiscal Year 2008. Our total MTVR requirement increased to 7,710 and MAS to 5,120 as a result of the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Armor Strategy and *Grow the Force* requirements.

Triad of Ground Indirect Fires Recent studies reconfirmed our requirement for a mix of air, naval surface, and ground-based fires and further validated the complementary, discriminating, and non-discriminating fires capabilities provided by the M777 lightweight 155mm towed howitzer, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and the Expeditionary Fire Support System.

- Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS) The EFSS will be the principal indirect fire support system for the vertical assault element of the Ship-to-Objective Maneuver as part of a MEF assault element. EFSS consists of two Internally Transportable Vehicle prime movers, a 120mm rifled towed mortar, an ammunition trailer, and ammunition. EFSS will be manned and supported by artillery regiments. In conjunction with the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53

helicopter, EFSS provides a 110 nautical mile radius, internal lift capability. Supported units will have immediately responsive, organic indirect fires at ranges and lethality well beyond their current battalion mortars. Fiscal Year 2009 provides \$22.1 million for accelerated procurement of forty-one EFSS systems and ammunition. EFSS recently completed successful operational testing. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is planned for Fiscal Year 2008, and Full Operational Capability (FOC) is planned for Fiscal Year 2010.

- Internally Transported Vehicle (ITV) The ITV is a family of vehicles that will provide deployed MAGTFs with MV-22/CH-53 internally and externally-transportable ground vehicles. The ITV program will field an expeditionary vehicle providing units equal or greater mobility than the maneuver elements they support. The Fiscal Year 2009 budget contains \$8 million for forty-four ITVs. ITV, along with the EFSS, recently successfully completed a Government Accounting Office audit and are currently undergoing a DoD Inspector General audit. IOC is planned during Fiscal Year 2008, and FOC is planned for Fiscal Year 2011.
- M777A2 Lightweight Howitzer The Lightweight 155 (M777A2) is a Joint USMC/Army Program in Full Rate Production which replaces all M198 howitzers. It can be lifted by the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53E helicopter and is paired with the MTRV for improved cross-country mobility. Through design innovation, navigation, positioning aides, and digital fire control, the M777A2 offers significant improvements in lethality (with the Excalibur precision munition capability), survivability and mobility. We began fielding the first new howitzers to the operating forces in April 2005 and expect to complete fielding in Fiscal Year 2011. With the recent T/E review, the new requirement is 511.
- High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) HIMARS fills a critical range and volume gap in Marine Corps fire support assets by providing twenty-four hour, all weather, ground-based, indirect precision and volume fires throughout all phases of combat operations ashore. When paired with Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets, HIMARS will provide a highly responsive, precision fire capability to our forces. We will reach IOC this September and expect to be at FOC by Fiscal Year 2010. There is \$109 million budgeted for procurement of HIMARS rockets. To date, we have fielded and trained one Reserve Battery and two Active Duty Batteries. Battery F, 2/14 completed the first operational deployment of

a Marine Corps HIMARS unit, firing twenty-four tactical rockets in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The new requirement for HIMARS is forty-six.

Ground Combat Tactical Mobility Research and Development In response to the 2006 Strategic Planning Guidance directing us to consider capability alternatives “to support a single two MEB forcible entry operation... and propose an appropriate mix of ground combat vehicles to support irregular warfare operations,” we developed the Marine Corps Ground Combat Tactical Mobility Strategy for light tactical wheeled vehicles and ground combat tactical vehicles. This strategy balances transportability through the seabase, mobility on land, and payload requirements with vehicle survivability against anticipated threats and force protection. The strategy further defines a triad of heavy, medium and light personnel carriers with EFV filling the heavy class. The medium and light classes will be filled by the Marine Personnel Carrier, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the previously-discussed ITV.

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) The EFV represents the **heavy** weight capability in our Ground Combat Tactical Mobility portfolio and is specifically suited to maneuver operations conducted from the sea and sustained operations in the world’s littoral regions. Its inherent capabilities provide utility across the spectrum of conflict. As the Corps’ largest ground combat system acquisition program, the EFV is the sole sea-based, surface-oriented vehicle that enables projection of combat power from a seabase to an objective. A fighting vehicle designed to strike fast and deep, it will replace the aging Assault Amphibious Vehicle — in service since 1972. The EFV’s amphibious mobility, speed of maneuver, day and night lethality, enhanced force protection capabilities, and robust communications will substantially improve joint force capabilities. Its over-the-horizon capability will enable amphibious ships to increase their standoff distance from the shore — protecting them from enemy anti-access weapons. An EFV Mine Protection feasibility study was completed last October which assessed external V-Hull, Internal V-Hull and appliqué configurations for survivability and performance impacts. The study concluded that the appliqué configuration provides increased mine blast protection with minimum performance impacts. A final EFV feasibility report from The Center for Naval Analyses concerning this enhanced armor configuration is expected this month. System development and demonstration has been extended to allow design for reliability through 2008,

and fabrication and test of seven new EFV prototypes, with Milestone C in 2011. Delivery of 573 vehicles will begin in 2013, with IOC in 2015 and FOC in 2025.

Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) The MPC represents the **medium** weight capability in the Ground Combat Tactical Mobility portfolio. It is not a replacement vehicle and instead will complement the capabilities offered by EFV and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle across the range of military operations. Increasing armor-protected mobility for infantry battalion task forces, the MPC program balances vehicle Performance, Protection and Payload attributes. Throughout 2007, joint staffing of an Initial Capabilities Document and a draft concept of employment were been completed. The MPC program is currently in preparation for a Milestone A decision in the 2nd quarter of Fiscal Year 2008 and on track for a Milestone B decision in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2010 with IOC in the 2015 timeframe. The requirement for MPC is 558 vehicles.

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) The JLTV represents the **light** weight capability in our Ground Combat Tactical Mobility portfolio and will be the centerpiece of our Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Fleet. This fleet will also include the HMMWV Expanded Capacity Vehicle series, the MRAP Vehicle, and the ITV for vertical assault elements to increase landward mobility and operational flexibility, providing a directed balance. The Army/Marine Corps Board has been the focal point for vetting of joint requirements for JLTV — which will provide protected, sustained, networked, and expeditionary mobility in the light tactical vehicle weight class. Throughout 2007, Army and Marine Corps combat and materiel developers coordinated with the Joint Staff, defining requirements and acquisition planning for the replacement for the HMMWV. In December, JLTV was approved for entry into the acquisition process at Milestone A with the Army as lead Service. A Request for Proposal was released this month initiating competitive prototyping for fabrication of a family of vehicles and companion trailers. After prototype evaluation, we expect at least three competitors to be selected for the technology development phase. We are committed to full funding of 5,500 JLTVs in Increment one.

Fiscal Year 2009 Aviation Procurement

Stress on legacy forces remains considerable as our level of commitment has remained at a surge rate for the past several years. Before the current conflict, we had a recurring commitment for twenty-one squadrons deployed and fifteen in workups preparing to deploy. The current commitment level is now forty-seven squadrons, or sixty-eight percent of Marine Aviation, currently deployed or preparing to deploy. The Commandant's *Grow the Force* plan will have the net effect of increasing total aviation manpower strength by fifteen percent. To relieve strain on the hardest hit communities and to increase long term capability, we are increasing the number of squadrons for Light Attack (AH-1W, UH-1N), Heavy Helicopters (CH-53E), and Unmanned Aerial Systems. These structure increases will be carefully managed to ensure there is no decrease in MAGTF capacity and will be contained in the Aviation Transition Plan.

MV-22B The MV-22 is in the process of replacing the CH-46E aircraft at a rate of two squadrons per year. To date, over fifty aircraft have been delivered to the Marine Corps with ten forward deployed to Al Asad, Iraq. Preliminary reports from theater are encouraging. The MV-22 program uses a block strategy in its procurement. The current operational configuration is Block B. Block C aircraft, operational aircraft with mission enhancements, will be procured in Fiscal Year 2010 and delivered in Fiscal Year 2012. The Fiscal Year 2009 budget request for \$2.3 billion is indicative of the increased ramp in production to thirty aircraft per year. The production rate through the Future Years Defense Plan will allow successful transition of two squadrons per year. The Research and Development (R&D) portion of the Fiscal Year 2009 request is \$68.2 million and will be used to further improve capabilities of the MV-22.

KC-130J The KC-130J is the backbone of Marine Aviation in OIF. Six aircraft have been continuously deployed in support of OIF since achieving IOC and have provided state of the art, multi-mission, tactical aerial refueling, and fixed wing assault support assets exceeding expectations. This year's deployment of the in-flight refueling capable MV-22 significantly increases the tanking requirement of the KC-130J community, therefore, the Fiscal Year 2009 budget requests \$160 million for procurement of two aircraft, associated spares, and advanced procurement. Due to the aircraft's proven success and the fact that we have nearly reached our goal of an all KC-130J fleet of aircraft for both active and reserve components, additional

requests for KC-130J advance procurement are contained in the Fiscal Year 2008 Supplemental bill.

Aviation Research and Development

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) The Marine Corps is taking aggressive action to modernize and improve organic UAS capabilities. We have begun successfully transitioning Tier III level Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadrons (VMU), one of our most stressed combat units, to the RQ-7B Shadow. We are reorganizing squadron force structure to support detachment-based flexibility, and begun the stand up a third active component VMU squadron. With significant support of the Army, we completed transition to the Shadow (an Army program of record) in less than nine months providing a mature, modern — yet basic and readily available Tier III platform upon which to baseline Marine VMU reorganization. This rapid transition and reorganization, begun in January 2007, will be complete by the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2009. The Fiscal Year 2009 budget requests \$20.9 million to continue efforts begun in Fiscal Year 2007 and to ensure a successful transition.

F-35B Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Following the successful rollout of the F-35B Lightning II in December 2007, development is on track with the first flight of BF-1 Short Take-Off / Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant scheduled for spring 2008. Like the MV-22, the JSF acquisition strategy uses a block approach. The Marine Corps remains committed to an all-STOVL tactical aircraft force. The program is unique in its dependence on performance based logistics to achieve necessary benchmarks. Consistent funding of the logistics effort is critical to meeting IOC in 2012. The Fiscal Year 2009 budget requests \$1.86 billion for procurement of eight airframes and \$99.4 million for performance based logistics and spares. The R&D component is \$928.2 million to continue development of fifth generation aircraft.

H-1 Upgrades The attack and utility helicopter community plays a critical role supporting Marines on the ground. To ensure continued support to the MAGTF our H-1 aircraft are in need of modernization. The UH-1N, for example, has not received any major modifications to its rotor and drive train systems since its delivery in 1971. The H-1 Upgrades Program will replace AH-1W and UH-1N helicopters with state-of-the-art AH-1Z and UH-1Y models. The H-1 Upgrades

Program, through a combination of remanufacture and build new, will upgrade our current legacy fleet to 100 UH-1Ys and 180 AH-1Zs. Increases in support of the *Grow the Force* plan will increase these numbers to 123 UH-1Ys and 227 AH-1Zs. To date, seven UH-1Y and four AH-1Z have been delivered. The first UH-1Y scheduled deployment is on track for the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2009. The program continues to seek opportunities to reduce unit cost and minimize the impact on current and future operational readiness. To support this effort and continue H-1 modernization, the Fiscal Year 2009 budget requests \$496.9 million for aircraft procurement and spares with \$3.9 million for continued R&D.

CH-53K In operation since 1981, the CH-53E is becoming increasingly expensive to operate and faces reliability and obsolescence issues. Its replacement, the CH-53K, will be capable of externally transporting 27,000 lbs to a range of 110 nautical miles, more than doubling the current CH-53E lift capability. Maintainability and reliability enhancements of the CH-53K will significantly decrease recurring operating costs and will radically improve aircraft efficiency and operational effectiveness over the current CH-53E. The IOC is scheduled for Fiscal Year 2015, and is defined as a detachment of four aircraft, ready to deploy. To meet the IOC the Fiscal Year 2009 budget requests \$611.2 million for R&D.

VI. Posture the Marine Corps for the future beyond the horizon Today, the United States faces a complex mix of states that sponsor terrorism, regional powers aspiring to attain weapons of mass destruction, failing states that undermine regional stability, and a variety of violent non-state actors — all serving to destabilize legitimate governments, limit American access and influence, and undercut the security of the greater global community. We see this global security context as a persistent condition for the foreseeable future, and beyond this period, we expect to have to prepare for a future of a more blurred character with states and non-state actors employing a wide range of conventional and irregular approaches including terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, rising peer competitors exploiting the economic and technological benefits of globalization will pose more direct and highly disruptive threats to our security interests.

Strategic Vision Group (SVG)

In order to improve our capacity to anticipate, the Commandant of the Marine Corps established an SVG in June of 2007. This group is designed assist the Commandant in determining how best to posture the Marine Corps for successful service to the nation in the years to come. The Group studies the future state of the world, considers the most likely world conditions and threats, and then conducts assessments of our military, political, and economic power to assess the implications for the country, the Department, and the Marine Corps from now through 2025. It characterizes the most likely conflicts as a blurred mix of irregular and conventional warfare in which terrorists, extremists, and criminals may become the most lethal and dominant enemy. Additionally, the SVG discerned that enemy states may adopt similar asymmetric tactics and techniques which will make access and combat more challenging. Once these critical assessments are in hand, the SVG translates them into tangible products addressing implications to national security and Marine Corps' continued readiness and relevance.

The SVG has made significant progress in synthesizing inputs from United States and allied strategic assessments, and has established relationships with a wider community of subject matter experts and related efforts in our sister Services. It has briefed our senior leadership on assessments of the 2025 security environments; the key patterns and trends that can be foreseen impacting the strategic context, and future operational environments. Most significantly, recent assessments prompted development of the Commandant's overarching Marine Corps Vision and Strategy. This document will provide a comprehensive, actionable, and compelling narrative that describes how the Marine Corps will continue to serve as the nation's "force in readiness" for the 21st Century and will be published in June of 2008.

Science and Technology (S&T)

By always keeping an eye to the future, advances in S&T provide an immediate, measurable advantage to our warfighters and provide for development and implementation of concepts only dreamed of twenty years ago. In light of this importance the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the Commandant recently completed and published a combined *Naval S&T Strategic Plan* that establishes objectives and provides direction to ensure our investments are focused on accomplishing the visions and goals of the Navy and Marine Corps. This plan identifies, as objectives, our five most critically needed technology enhancements:

- lightening the load of our dismounted Marines and Sailors through new materials and technologies that are both lighter and that provide enhanced protection;
- the application of robotics to ground logistics delivery and a cargo unmanned aerial vehicle to rapidly move logistics on a distributed battlefield;
- high-fidelity simulation in support of small unit ground tactical training;
- improved vehicle survivability for our future family of tactical vehicles through the application of new construction materials such as synthetic armor;
- persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance technologies aimed specifically at providing tactically relevant intelligence in all phases of a broad spectrum of operations.

Experimentation

The future landscape requires us to develop highly agile capabilities that will support decentralized forms of execution. Our ground and air procurement requirements, in conjunction with developments in S&T, provide a holistic approach to confronting present and future adversaries. Marine Corps experimentation is currently focused on enhancing company-level capabilities since operational lessons learned show that our infantry companies are being assigned missions and areas of responsibility traditionally assigned to battalions. Ongoing experiments such as our Company-level Intelligence Cell, Company-level Operations Cell, and Squad Fires are designed to provide companies with the training, manpower, and equipment necessary to accomplish complex, decentralized missions over large areas. These experiments are an outgrowth of our 2004-2006 Distributed Operations experimentation that focused on the rifle platoon, rifle squads, and their small unit leaders. This is a building block approach to creating tactical units that are more agile, lethal and survivable, while maintaining our maneuver warfare doctrine. These tactical units are the key to winning on both today's battlefields and those we expect in the future.

VII. Resetting the force The Marines have now been in the fight for over five years. Intense combat operations and demanding predeployment training are taking a toll on our equipment. We must replace worn out and destroyed equipment at an accelerated rate. Our equipment maintenance and replacement costs are currently Global War on Terror (GWOT) funded. Our additional challenge is that we must "reset the force" by restoring and maintaining traditional

capabilities even as we identify and build new capabilities for the future. We are very thankful that Congress has been extremely supportive in providing required GWOT funding. We also look forward to receiving the \$1.3 billion reset funding remaining in the Fiscal Year 2008 GWOT. This funding is critical to our continued reset efforts.

With Congress' help over the last three years we have begun to make significant progress in drawing down our reset requirements. To date Congress has provided \$10.9 billion in supplemental funding towards our estimated current total reset the force requirement of \$15.6 billion. The timely appropriation of procurement funds in the Title IX funds in Fiscal Year 2007 allowed us an early start on this year's procurement actions that will ultimately provide new and improved equipment to our Marines.

Ground Equipment Between twenty and thirty percent of our ground equipment and approximately twenty percent of our tactical aviation inventories are continuously deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. This is a sizeable portion of Marine Corps equipment, and extended combat operations have significantly degraded the numbers and material condition of it. While the vast majority of our equipment has withstood the test of sustained combat operations, it has been subject to many times the programmed wear because of increased vehicle mileage, operating hours, and harsh environmental conditions. The consequences are severe, not only from operational tempo and operating environments, but also from the sheer amount of equipment deployed in operations. To address those realities, a more robust principal end item (PEI) rotation plan is now in place and detailed planning for eventual retrograde of the remaining major elements of OIF equipment is underway. We have rotated 1,781 PEIs thus far. Both efforts will be factored into future reset cost estimates as soon as the supporting details are developed.

Aviation Platforms and Equipment Without hot legacy production lines, resetting Marine Aviation means not merely repairing and replacing damaged or destroyed aircraft, but getting more capable and reliable new production aircraft into the operational deployment cycle sooner. Most production lines to replace legacy aircraft lost during the current fight are no longer active; therefore, it is urgent and imperative for the Marine Aviation Plan to remain fully funded and on schedule. In the meantime, we are restoring eight CH-53E war reserve aircraft for return to active service and two additional CH-53Ds. We are nearing the bottom of the barrel for available

CH-53s –a real workhorse. We are also asking for upgrades of MV-22 pre-production aircraft to help maintain aircraft inventories at minimal acceptable operating levels. Resetting our aviation capabilities requires full support of current and future baseline and Supplemental budget requests.

VIII. Conclusion Your Marine Corps will remain in the fight to the finish. To continue to serve our Nation as a multi-capable force, our priorities are: our Marines in combat; growing the force and resetting our force to serve our Nation for the next contingency; and preparing our force for the future. To achieve these priorities, we must balance and maintain our essential modernization programs even as we conduct the current fight. Borrowing from the long term for the immediate need poses a potential risk to future warfighting capability. Modern weapons development programs sometimes take upwards of a decade or more from concept approval to initial production. A significant source of program cost growth occurs when developmental or production programs are stretched out to provide resources for near-term operational requirements. While we need robust research and development funding responsive to the highly adaptive nature of the evolving threats we face, we must maintain our longer term investments in Science and Technology.

Our Nation rightfully has high expectations of her Corps—as she should. Your Marines are answering the call around the globe, performing with distinction in the face of great hardships. As they continue to serve in harm’s way, our moral imperative is to fully support them—we owe them the full resources required to complete the tasks we have given them. Now more than ever we need the sustained support of the American people and the Congress to simultaneously fight the enemy today and prepare for tomorrow’s threat. Again, we thank you for the opportunity to report to you on their behalf.