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**FOR THE RECORD**

**STATEMENT BY**

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**BEFORE THE**

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIR AND LAND FORCES**

**SECOND SESSION, 110<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS**

**ON**

**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE EQUIPMENT  
POSTURE**

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THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

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Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, we appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to address readiness of the Army National Guard at the level of detail possible in an open, unclassified format. Of course, I stand ready to provide more detailed data to you and your staff in a classified fashion. As you know, the Army National Guard is a reserve component of the Army. As such, our purpose is to provide trained and ready units for State and Federal missions.

Since September 11, 2001, Army National Guard (ARNG) Soldiers have been protecting our Homeland and fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in Iraq and Afghanistan alongside their Active Component counterparts. At the same time, our units have undergone an extensive reorganization to a modular force and assumed an active role as an “operational” force vice the Cold War “strategic” posture.

In combination, these activities have caused increased demands on our equipment and increased equipment requirements. The ARNG equipping levels for CONUS units fell from 70% in 2001 to as low as 40% during 2006. Thanks to commitments from senior leaders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the United States Army, and Congress's support of the President's budget, our equipment levels have risen sharply over the last two years and will continue to rise. Funding provided in the current budget and projected funding from the Army will provide for additional means to improve our equipment posture by delivering additional equipment to Army National Guard units. However, equipment challenges will persist.

Several factors have contributed to the decline of the Army National Guard equipping levels between 2001 and 2006. First, as Army National Guard units converted to modular formations, many of their older, obsolete equipment were no longer considered deployable assets. At the same time, the modular concept required that our units be equipped with multiple new and highly capable but expensive systems. Second, extensive “cross-leveling” of equipment was required to ensure that deploying units had the systems needed to fight and win on the battlefield. However, much of this equipment was left behind in theater for reuse by incoming units. As a result, many of our units returned home with a fraction of the items they had taken to war. Third, much of the Army National Guard equipment was repositioned to augment the Army’s post-mobilization training needs at mobilization stations. Although Army National Guard

units ultimately utilized and benefited from this equipment, it was not “on hand” for use in conducting domestic missions. The net result of the Army National Guard’s modularity conversions and support of GWOT has been a significant increase in the requirement for equipment and modernization while units have seen a significant decrease in the level of equipment available for pre-mobilization training and domestic missions.

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, the Army adopted a new strategy to fully equip the Reserve Components to Active Component standards, which represented a major paradigm shift from the Cold War practice of tiered resourcing. During that year, the Chief of Staff of the Army fenced \$21 Billion of its procurement funding for the Army National Guard ground equipment; another \$1.9 Billion for aviation equipment covering the periods beginning with FY2005 to ending with FY2011. This commitment has since increased to almost \$45 Billion through FY2013 which includes Grow the Army and Supplemental funding requests.

First, our equipment challenges affect our ability to function as an operational reserve by precluding the collective training required of Army National Guard units prior to mobilization. Second, these equipping challenges require constant cross-leveling of critical assets. Third, equipment challenges affect in our capability to conduct domestic missions. Finally and most importantly, equipping shortfalls may limit the Army National Guard's ability to fully mobilize or surge, in a timely manner, to meet critical operational and domestic requirements.

The Army National Guard, via the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA), has received \$735 million in FY 2006, \$1.075 billion in FY 2007, and \$645 million in FY 2008. This has been used to procure critical dual use items that support what have been identified as “the Essential 10 capabilities for the GWOT.” The Essential 10 capabilities consist of command and control, communications, aviation, force protection (to include Civil Support Teams), engineer, logistics, maintenance, medical, security and transportation.

I take this opportunity to thank Congress for its continued support.