“At our hearing in July, I indicated we were having difficulties reconciling MRAP vehicle program office provided data on production schedules.  At the time, I noted this as indicative of the challenges involved with a program of this size, moving at such a rapid pace. 

   “Since July, the program office and the Department seem to have made significant improvement in responding to those difficulties in providing accurate information, and I commend you on that effort.

   “However, the MRAP vehicle program continues to present a major acquisition challenge that has broader implications regarding DOD’s tactical vehicle acquisition strategy, expected future combat environments, and of course, how that relates to future budget requirements.

   “Not so many months ago the Army was reluctant to embrace major procurement of MRAP vehicles and has only recently done so with the caveat that the MRAP program is not a program of record, indicating MRAP vehicles only apply to the current circumstances in Iraq and implying no further use of the vehicles after their use in Iraq. 

   “Given that DOD has determined that MRAP vehicles are its number one acquisition requirement, how is it that it appears that expected future combat environments are so much different that MRAP-like vehicle capabilities will not be required?

   “DOD has also characterized MRAP as a major defense acquisition program of the highest category, with Secretary Young as the primary acquisition executive.  I am curious then as to why shouldn’t this program be considered a program of record.  Where do the MRAP vehicles fit into future tactical wheeled acquisitions?  Will the fiscal year 2009 budget and future years defense program include appropriate levels of operations and maintenance funding for the MRAP vehicle inventory?

   “I might note that the Stryker vehicle was once considered an interim solution.  Given the planned $25 billion commitment to MRAP vehicles – a commitment that is likely to grow if history holds precedent,  and given the lack of proven armor technology that significantly changes the current correlation between weight, height, and vehicle protection, we had better plan on MRAP vehicles as more than an interim, throw-away solution for force protection.

   “I’m also curious as to when and how the MRAP II vehicle fits into the current strategy and what impacts this program will have on the industrial supply base.  Will the MRAP II vehicle program be a program of record?

   “One other issue that the MRAP program has highlighted that is of continuing concern, is fundamental to the broader issue of joint programs.  Many of the current defense acquisition programs are called joint programs.  However, when you peel back a layer you find the program is really "joint" only in name.

   “While MRAP vehicles are being procured jointly, there is a lack of standardization among the mission essential equipment being integrated into the vehicles. 

   “MRAP vehicles are all being used against the same threat in similar operational environments, yet each military service and special operations command has its own specific equipment package.  As a result, the facility doing the installation work potentially has to integrate at least 24 different vehicle configurations at one time. 

   “As monthly production numbers increase dramatically, this many configurations could generate major problems once the basic vehicles are delivered to where the final integration is done.  Ultimately this results in delay in vehicles being delivered to Iraq.

   “If there was one standardized mission equipment package, or at least fewer configurations than currently planned, for all the services and special operation command, this could potentially accelerate the installation process and in turn get more vehicles to Iraq at a much faster rate. 

   “It’s imperative that the civilian leadership in the department effectively address the problem of joint acquisition programs that are joint in name only.

   “I’m hoping the witnesses today will be able to respond to these issues and assure our subcommittees every option is being pursued to produce and field these vehicles since what we’re really discussing today is protecting our men and women in uniform.

   “Thank you Mr. Chairman.”