



**Department of Energy**  
National Nuclear Security Administration  
Washington, DC 20585

February 26, 2008

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY

FROM: WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF *W.C. Ostendorff*  
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR

ACTION: RESPONSE TO REMAINING QUESTIONS IN THE  
FEBRUARY 6, 2008, LETTER TO THE SECRETARY FROM  
HOUSE ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE  
CHAIRMAN DINGELL AND SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN  
STUPAK RE: THE DEPARTMENT'S GLOBAL INITIATIVES  
FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM

**Question # 1a: A list of all Russian institutes that are or have been funded by the IPP (in whole or in part) since the program inception. Such list should be in a searchable format, and include the years of the project, the project description, and the amount of funding.**

The attached list (Tab A; CD version also provided) identifies Russian institutes that are or have been funded by the program since its inception. The list is based on information available in the program's Lotus Notes data management system. It is important to note that the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program did not have such a data management system before 1999, when projects were maintained in paper files. We are continuing to search those paper files, and will forward additional names of institutes should any surface.

**Question #1b: This list should delineate all Russian institutes funded by the IPP which are or have provided materials, equipment, engineering, design, construction, operations support, training, computer hardware or software, or other services to Iran for any aspect of its nuclear program. For each Russian institute, please describe the types of support provided to the Iranian nuclear program.**

Additional time is needed to research and respond completely and accurately to this request, as it requires that we search through a large volume of records and classified material. Once complete, we would be pleased to provide this information to appropriately cleared individuals. To put this information in context, we would also welcome the opportunity to provide a classified briefing to such individuals at the Committee's convenience.



**Question #2: A list of all Russian scientists who are or were funded by the IPP program and worked at institutes involved with the Iranian nuclear program. This list should identify which scientists were simultaneously or subsequently employed on projects relating to the Iranian nuclear program.**

Additional time is needed to research and respond completely and accurately to this request, as it requires that we search through a large volume of records and classified material. Once complete, we would be pleased to provide this information to appropriately cleared individuals. To put this information in context, we would also welcome the opportunity to provide a classified briefing to such individuals at the Committee's convenience. At this stage of our review, we have no information indicating that Russian scientists funded by GIPP were also known to be supporting Iran's nuclear program.

**Question #3: Any policy or procedures related to assessments of Iran's nuclear program as it relates to approval of IPP program funds.**

As noted in the prior set of responses to the Committee, GIPP program guidance, which was previously provided to the Committee, establishes review procedures for project proposals to determine whether there are proliferation concerns associated with the projects or entities carrying out project work. The program guidance is generic rather than specific to a particular country, and directs that all project proposals require "a review among the various [Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration] Program Offices and U.S. Government agencies for a full evaluation in terms of congruence with U.S. policy, nonproliferation impact and program coordination." This process involves the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, and the intelligence community. In those instances where an export license or authorization is required, the license application is reviewed by the appropriate U.S. interagency export control committee.

**Question #4: Forms and procedures used by DOE and its participating labs and institutes to verify that no funds are spent on scientists or institutes involved with nuclear weapons programs, as required by Section 3136(a) of the fiscal year 2000 Defense Authorization Act.**

The attached form (Tab B) is the standard document used by GIPP to transmit project proposals for interagency review. To ensure that funds are spent in compliance with section 3136(a), and as noted in the previous response, all GIPP project proposals require "a review among the various [Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration] Program Offices and U.S. Government agencies for a full evaluation in terms of congruence with U.S. policy, nonproliferation impact and program coordination." GIPP program guidance also requires that the Department and national laboratory experts assess each project for proliferation potential and to monitor "projects throughout their lifecycle ... in order to maintain project and program integrity."

Compliance with section 3136(a) is also accomplished through the export control review process. Procedures for export control review by the national laboratories are contained in the attached "Guide for Technical Review of Export License Applications," prepared by the Department's export control office (Tab C). These procedures require review of the technology and end-user for risk of diversion or contribution to weapons of mass destruction programs, using all available information including relevant intelligence information.

**Question #5: A current list of all DOE-funded projects planned or underway in Russia or other FSU countries related to GNEP, with the program's funding source clearly identified.**

Listed below are projects previously approved for implementation in partnership with Russia to advance nuclear energy and nonproliferation objectives, including advanced fuel cycle efforts and strengthened international safeguards. The funding source for each is indicated. Only project #4 noted below is underway. The other projects are either in development or awaiting final agreement by the parties (i.e., the International Science and Technology Center and the U.S. national laboratory and Russian participants). Projects that may involve export-controlled information or technology (#1-3 below) were structured so that the technology flow is from Russia to the United States.

Projects approved in FY 2007

1. Modified TRUEX and TALSPEAK Processes
  - a. *Funding source: GIPP (Russian and partial U.S. costs for national laboratory oversight), DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (contributes to U.S. costs for national laboratory oversight)*
  - b. *Project structured so that export-controlled information or technology flows from Russia to the United States*
2. Diamide Derivatives of Dipicolinic Acid in Polar Diluents as Actinide and Lanthanide Extractants
  - a. *Funding source: GIPP (Russian and partial U.S. costs for national laboratory oversight), DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (contributes to U.S. costs for national laboratory oversight)*
  - b. *Project structured so that export-controlled information or technology flows from Russia to the United States*
3. Production of TRU-containing oxide fuel pins/targets for transmutation in the BOR-60 fast reactor
  - a. *Funding Source: GIPP*
  - b. *Project structured so that export-controlled information or technology flows from Russia to the United States*

4. Actinide Nano-particles Environmental Behavior Relevant to Safe Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High Level Waste in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle
  - a. *Funding Source: GIPP*
  - b. *Project does not involve export-controlled information or technology*
5. Solidification technologies for radioactive and chemical liquid waste treatment
  - a. *Funding Source: GIPP; Nochar, Inc. Pacific Nuclear Solutions (U.S. Industry Partner)*
  - b. *Project does not involve export-controlled information or technology*

Projects approved in FY 2008

6. Advanced Safeguards for Uranium Enrichment Facilities
  - a. *Funding Source: GIPP*
  - b. *Project does not involve export-controlled information or technology*
7. Enhancing Safeguards in Reprocessing of Nuclear Fuel
  - a. *Funding Source: GIPP*
  - b. *Project does not involve export-controlled information or technology*

**Question #6: A public version of the Transmittal and the Report of the United States and the Russian Federation Joint Working Group on the Development of a Bilateral Action Plan to Enhance Global and Bilateral Nuclear Energy Cooperation, dated December 15, 2006, with attachments.**

The requested document is attached (Tab D).

Attachments:

- Tab A: List of institutes
- Tab B: Project proposal form
- Tab C: Guide for export control review
- Tab D: Joint working group report