The US strategy against Isis is working – for Assad

The Syrian president is the beneficiary of a muddled campaign that leaves him free to strike against his own enemies
Bashar al-Assad
Bashar al-Assad: 'prefers perpetual war with Isis'. Photograph: AP

Bashar al-Assad was in a relaxed and hospitable frame of mind a couple of weeks ago, according to a Syrian expat who met him in Damascus. True, the US was now leading a coalition attacking Islamic State (Isis) fighters on Syrian soil as well as in Iraq, but he had received firm assurances that it would not be targeting his own forces. The only thing, the president admitted, was a nagging worry that the Americans could not be trusted.

The word from Washington, passed on via Syria’s UN envoy and the Iranians, was that Barack Obama was focused firmly on the jihadi threat and had no intention of helping other rebels who are fighting to overthrow Assad, the guest told friends.

The fact is that in the second month of the US-led air campaign, American and western policy towards Syria is in disarray and perhaps facing disaster. Operation Inherent Resolve does not seem worthy of its grandiose name, hence Assad’s surprisingly upbeat mood.

The latest blow to his enemies was suffered by the Syrian Revolutionary Front and Harakat Hazm, both groups the US hoped would become the nucleus of an anti-Isis force. Last weekend in the Idlib area they lost ground and weapons to Jabhat al-Nusra, a battle-hardened al-Qaida-aligned outfit which was hit by US air strikes again on Thursday. The problem, say critics, is that Obama is taking a narrow counter-terrorist view of Syria and has no strategy for tipping the scales – even though he claims to want to force Assad to negotiate an end to the war. Jabhat al-Nusra men are now reportedly fighting alongside Isis.

“The US,” said the analyst Faysal Itani, “wants its allies in Syria to fight its enemies but not their own, and will not even give them military support to do so effectively.” Many note the gap between verbal commitments and investment. “US strategy against Isis puts moderate Syrian rebel forces in an impossible situation,” tweeted Emile Hokayem of the International Institute for Strategic Studies: ”Assad benefiting, Isis/Jabhat al-Nusra appearing as anti-Assad champions.”

Fighting Isis in Iraq is tough but still easier, with Kurdish peshmerga and a functioning if incompetent and sectarian Iraqi army. US plans for organising Syrian “boots on the ground” looked problematic even before the latest losses. The $500m (£300m) “train and equip” programme for a 5,000-strong force is modest and painfully slow-moving. Vetting to prevent (more) US weapons falling into the “wrong” hands has yet to begin.

And events on the battlefields are not standing still. Coalition air strikes have caused civilian casualties while leaving Assad to act with impunity, dropping deadly barrel bombs with even greater frequency than before – and, gallingly, close to where Isis has been hit by US attacks.

Appeals for a no-fly zone to ground the Syrian air force continue to fall on deaf ears. Hadi al-Bahra, president of the ineffective western-backed Syrian National Coalition, is unlikely to get a different response when he attends the shrinking Friends of Syria forum in London next week. It is a sign of the sluggish pace of international diplomacy that foreign ministers will not be attending.

This week saw a flurry of interest in a proposal by a European NGO to expand local ceasefires and freeze the situation on the ground. Supporters see this as the only way out of the current impasse while acknowledging that it would give the Syrian government the upper hand. Critics oppose it for that reason while warning of a growing trend in European countries – especially by domestic security chiefs fixated by the Isis “blowback” threat – to cooperate with Assad.

Anecdotal evidence also suggests scepticism in Arab coalition partners – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan and Bahrain – which fear a Sunni backlash and question a policy galvanised by the beheading of four western journalists but not by the 200,000 Syrian deaths that preceded them. Mistrust of Obama and fear of an impending US-nuclear deal with (Shia) Iran have to be factored into that mood.

“The limitations of US policy on Syria were obvious from the start and have become more apparent,” observed Noah Bonsey of the International Crisis Group. “it is not clear that air strikes against Isis have been a step forward. The Assad regime is getting near to the point where it can deal a really serious blow to the viability of the forces that Washington has identified as its allies moving forward. It prefers perpetual war with Isis and feels the west will be compelled to work with it.”

No wonder, say dispirited Syrian opposition figures, that Assad sounds more relaxed than embattled these days.