True the Vote v. IRS Ruling
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Published by The Heritage Foundation
Dismissal of case from True the Vote regarding the IRS targeting scandal.
Dismissal of case from True the Vote regarding the IRS targeting scandal.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
__________________________________________ ) TRUE THE VOTE, INC., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 13-734 (RBW) ) INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) __________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiff, True the Vote, Inc., filed this civil action against the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), the United States of America, and several IRS officials in both their official and individual capacities,
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alleging violations of the First Amendment, the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012), the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012), and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. See First Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 13, 139-214. Currently before the Court are the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, IV[,] and V (“Defs.’ Mot.”) of the Complaint; the Individual Management Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Count III of the Complaint] (“Mgmt. Mot.”); the Motion to Dismiss [Count III of the Complaint] of Cincinnati Defendants Susan Maloney, Ronald Bell, Janine L. Estes, and Faye Ng (“Cincinnati Mot.”); and the Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Agency
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The individual defendants are: David Fish, Steven Grodnitzky, Lois Lerner, Steven Miller, Holly Paz, Michael Seto, Douglas Shulman, Cindy Thomas, William Wilkins, Susan Maloney, Ronald Bell, Janine L. Estes, and Faye Ng. For purposes of resolving the several motions to dismiss, these individual defendants fall into two categories: the Individual Management defendants (Steven Grodnitzky, Lois Lerner, Steven Miller, Holly Paz, Michael Seto, Douglas Shulman, Cindy Thomas, and William Wilkins) and the Cincinnati defendants (Susan Maloney, Ronald Bell, Janine L. Estes, and Faye Ng).
2 Action (“Pl.’s Mot.”).
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For the following reasons, the Court concludes that it must grant all of the defendants’ motions to dismiss and deny the plaintiff’s motion to stay agency action.
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I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff asserts that it “is a not-for-profit Texas corporation organized and operated exclusively or primarily for a charitable purpose.” Am. Compl. ¶ 2. On July 15, 2010, the plaintiff filed an application with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for tax-exempt status pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(a)(vi). Id. ¶¶ 3-4; see also id. ¶ 53. After “receiv[ing] no further contact from the IRS [d]efendants during [the] calendar year 2010,” id. ¶ 54, the plaintiff asked Texas Senator John Cornyn to “inquire[] of the IRS as to the status of [the plaintiff]’s application for tax-exempt status,” id. ¶ 55. On February 5, 2011, the plaintiff received a “letter sent from the Cincinnati, Ohio IRS office” requesting “additional information from [the plaintiff] to complete the IRS’[s] consideration of [the plaintiff]’s [a]pplication.” Id. ¶ 56.
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In addition to the submissions already identified, the Court considered the following filings submitted by the parties in rendering its decision: (1) True the Vote’s Opposition to the Government’s Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, IV, and V (“Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot.”); (2) the Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, IV[,] and V (“Defs.’ Reply”); (3) the Supplement to [the] Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, IV[,] and V (“Defs.’ Supplement”); (4) the Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental Authority [Regarding Counts I, II, IV, and V] (“Pl.’s Supp’l Authority I”); (5) the Federal Defendants’ Response to [the] Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental Authority [Regarding Counts I, II, IV, and V] (“Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Supp’l Authority I”); (6) the Memorandum in Support of [the] Individual Management Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Mgmt. Mem.”); (7) the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Cincinnati Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Cincinnati Mem.”); (8) True the Vote’s Opposition to [the] Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Opp’n to Mgmt. and Cincinnati Mots.”); (9) the Reply Brief in Support of Individual Management Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Mgmt. Reply”); (10) the Reply in Support of the Cincinnati Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Cincinnati Reply”); (11) the Individual Defendants’ Joint Notice of Supplemental Authority (“Joint Supp’l Authority”); (12) the Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental Authority [Regarding Count III] (“Pl.’s Supp’l Authority II”); (13) the Federal Defendants’ Response to [the] Plaintiff[’s] Notice of Supplemental Authority [Regarding Count III] (“Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Supp’l Authority II”); (14) the Opposition to [the] Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Agency Action (“Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot.”); (15) the Plaintiff’s Reply to [the] Federal Defendants’ Opposition to Motion to Stay Agency Action (“Pl.’s Reply”); (16) the Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental Authority (“Pl.’s Supp’l Authority III”); and (17) the Individual Defendants’ Joint Response to [the] Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental Authority (“Mgmt. and Cincinnati Resps. to Pl.’s Supp’l Authority III”).
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The Court’s opinion should not be interpreted as an assessment of the propriety of the alleged conduct by the defendants, as resolution of the motions does not require an assessment of the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.
3 On March 7 and March 8, 2011, that information was “furnished to the IRS.” Id. ¶ 57. Then, on October 12, 2011, the plaintiff “contacted the IRS” to follow up on its application for tax-exempt status. Id. ¶ 60. The plaintiff was allegedly told that “the Washington, [DC] office had assumed primary approval responsibility” for the plaintiff’s application. Id. ¶ 60. On November 8, 2011, the plaintiff “submitted to the IRS additional information” about itself, as well as “legal precedent . . . that provided the IRS [d]efendants the legal basis” for approving the plaintiff’s application. Id. ¶ 61. The following year, on February 8, 2012, the plaintiff received another letter “from the Cincinnati, Ohio IRS office” stating that “the IRS needed even more information” from the plaintiff to complete its consideration of the plaintiff’s tax-exempt application. Id. ¶ 63. That additional information was provided to the IRS on March 20, 2012. Id. ¶ 64. After providing that information, the plaintiff received a third letter on October 9, 2012, from “the Cincinnati, Ohio IRS office,” “request[ing] still more information.” Id. ¶ 66. The plaintiff complied with that information request on November 30, 2012. Id. ¶ 67. Based on its correspondence with the IRS, the plaintiff alleges that due to its “mission of promoting election integrity and its perceived association with ‘Tea Party’ organizations, the IRS [d]efendants systematically targeted [the plaintiff’s] application for unwarranted delay and heightened review and scrutiny,” thereby subjecting the plaintiff “to numerous unnecessary, burdensome, and unlawful requests for information about its operations, activities, leadership, volunteers, associations, and affiliations.” Id. ¶ 5. As support for its position, the plaintiff cites a May 10, 2013 “meeting of the Exempt Organizations Committee of the Tax Section of the American Bar Association,” where one of the individual defendants “admitted . . . that the IRS had selected applications for tax-exempt status for further review and scrutiny ‘simply because
