The AG's office filed its notice of appeal in the latest round of school-finance litigation. As expected, this notice was filed as a direct appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, bypassing the intermediate level of review. A group of school districts has also filed its own notice of appeal.

This kind of direct appeal is permitted in certain narrow circumstances, a process I've written about before. The previous round of litigation in 2005, West Orange Cove II was also a direct appeal. West Orange Cove I, however, took the more usual route through the intermediate courts.

The next step is for the parties to formally ask the Texas Supreme Court to accept jurisdiction. Mirroring the process for direct appeals in the U.S. Supreme Court, this is done through filing a Jurisdictional Statement that stands in place of a petition for review. If the Court wishes to review the case, it will do so by 'noting jurisdiction' and setting the case for full briefing and future argument.

A party who does not participate in the trial court hearing that leads to the judgment being challenged can file a notice of restricted appeal for up to six months after judgment, as compared to the normal 30-day notice of appeal deadline. The wrinkle here is that the judgment recited that the party had appeared at the key hearing — while other aspects of the trial court record indicated that she had not.

The underlying dispute involves child custody. About two years after a divorce, the father moved to modify the court's custody order to appoint him sole managing conservator. A hearing was set for September 2011, and while the father appeared by telephone, the mother did not. The trial court did not enter an order until November 2011. That order, in turn, began with recitals stating that the hearing occurred in November 2011 and that the mother appeared.

The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals was not bound by the recital on the face of the judgment and, instead, should have considered the other indications in the record that — here, at least — conclusively established that the relevant hearing was the one that took place in September 2011.

The Court emphasized that this record was truly overwhelming:

Importantly, nothing in the record indicates the hearing took place in November 2011. And at least eight references in the record, including portions of the trial court’s docket sheet and the reporter’s record, conclusively confirm the hearing occurred in September 2011 and the petitioner did not participate.

When the record is less conclusive, a party may have a much more difficult time trying to challenge an incorrect recital in a judgment that threatens to deprive the appellate courts of jurisdiction.

This petition challenges a jury verdict that certain chemicals caused a fire within a facility storing many other chemicals, on the basis that (1) the expert's opinions were not supported by a sufficient foundation and (2) the evidence was legally insufficient.

Among the issues identified in the petition:

• that it "credits expert testimony that damages are 'consistent with' a particular
  causation theory rather than requiring probative evidence of causation"

• that it includes "proof of causation by process of elimination"

• that they expert testimony was admitted without "requiring each part of the causation theory to be supported by testing or other scientifically reliable evidence"

• that it "[d]isregards undisputed test results conducted by a defendant’s experts that
  disprove a plaintiff’s theory"

The family of a child who was abused by a babysitter brought this claim against the babysitter's mother, who had made a misleading flyer about his trustworthiness as a babysitter, and the church that distributed that flyer. The allegation is that he was "troubled" with known psychiatric issues and that on the second babysitting session, he sexually abused two young boys. The jury found the defendants liable.

The court of appeals reversed and rendered, concluding that the evidence of causation presented here was legally insufficient based on Doe v. Boys Club of Dallas, also a sexual abuse case. In Boys Club, the Court held that the chain of causation had been essentially broken by other links between the abuser and the victim's family, such that the original lies were no longer a "substantial factor" causing the injury.

The petition asks the Court to hold that Boys Club was not meant to be a blanket protection for those whose misrepresentations might be linked to sexual abuse. The respondents argue that the sexual abuse was not the "natural and probable" result of the misrepresentation because the conduct was so extraordinary that it broke the chain of causation.

In a quite long-running case, the dispute here is how to determine the start date for post-judgment interest when the original judgment goes up on appeal and is partially changed on remand.

The petition contends that the interest should be computed beginning in 2012. It argues that the original 1998 judgment was not itself final — that it was an interlocutory order not itself appealed to the court of appeals. It also argues that the substantive nature of the remand (involving the introduction of new evidence, some by the plaintiff) warranted treating the 2012 award as the starting point for computing interest.

This suit grows from an unsatisfied customer of US Metals. Exxon bought and installed 350 pieces of drilling equipment (well neck flanges) but then later determined that they were the source of some problems, requiring the equipment — which had been installed by being welded in among other heavy equipment — to be removed at substantial cost, both in terms of raw expense and lost production during the time that the wells were not operating.

US Metals held a commercial general liability insurance policy that protected it against claims for "property damage" and "bodily injury."

But US Metals's insurer refused to cover the defense of this claim, citing certain exclusions related to damage caused by deficiencies related to "your [the insured's] product", as well as certain types of damage claims for "impaired property."

The Fifth Circuit has now asked the Texas Supreme Court to address, as a question of Texas law, whether two of the pivotal terms in the contract language defining this exclusion ("physical injury" and "replacement") are ambiguous and, if not, what they mean under Texas insurance law.

In making this request, the Fifth Circuit emphasized its view that this was a question of potentially broad importance:

The Texas Supreme Court’s interpretation of these terms will have far-reaching implications due to the commonality of these exclusions within CGL policies. As such, the answer to our certified questions will affect a large number of litigants. No Texas court or any other state or circuit court has determined whether the terms "physical injury" or "replacement" found within the "your property" and "impaired property" exclusions are ambiguous.

This legal point will now be briefed in the Texas Supreme Court, and the case will most likely be heard at oral argument next spring. You can read more details in the Fifth Circuit's opinion certifying the question.

This is a slip-and-fall case with a twist: The injured person was an employee who was cleaning up the spill:

Kroger's Safety Handbook provided that store management should "make certain that the Spill Magic Spill Response Stations [were] adequately supplied at all times" and available in numerous places throughout the store. Spill Magic allows an employee to clean a liquid spill with a broom and dustpan, and — according to Kroger's Safety Handbook — reduces the likelihood of a slip-and-fall by 25 percent. Because there was no Spill Magic on premises that day, Austin cleaned the spill with a dry mop instead. When Austin moved on to the men's restroom, he saw that the same substance covered about 80 percent of the floor. Austin placed "Wet Floor" signs inside and outside of the room, and proceeded to mop the spill for about thirty to thirty-five minutes. Austin took "baby steps" in and out of the restroom to change out the mop head numerous times, and successfully removed about thirty to forty percent of the liquid.

At about 10:30 a.m., while continuing to remedy the spill, Austin fell. He sustained a left femur fracture and severely dislocated his hip. He spent nine months in the hospital and underwent six surgeries, and his left leg is now two inches shorter than his right.

The employer did not subscribe to the Texas Workers Compensation system, so the claim falls through to common law.

The federal court decided that at least part of the case — a conventional negligence theory based on failure to provide the employee with "a necessary instrumentality" (the Spill Magic) — should be remanded to the federal district court for further proceedings. What it did not know was whether the premises liability theory was also viable — or whether that theory is precluded under Texas law.

So, it has certified the question:

Pursuant to Texas law, including §406.033(a)(1)–(3) of the Texas Labor Code, can an employee recover against a non-subscribing employer for an injury caused by a premises defect of which he was fully aware but that his job duties required him to remedy? Put differently, does the employee’s awareness of the defect eliminate the employer’s duty to maintain a safe workplace?

The Fifth Circuit detailed its analysis of the underlying "tension" within these branches of Texas tort law in its opinion certifying the questions.

This petition asks one question: "Where a plaintiff’s initial petition asserts only tort claims against a governmental unit and its employees, and the unit moves to dismiss the employees under section 101.106(e), must a trial court grant the motion to dismiss even if the plaintiff amended her pleading to drop the tort claims and add other claims before the court rules on the motion?"

Here, after a state entity moved to dismiss tort claims brought against it and an employee, the plaintiff amended to add federal Section 1983 claims. The state argues that this amendment was improper (and the whole case must be dismissed) because it had filed a Section 101.106 dismissal motion prior ot the amendment.

The Court originally denied the petition for review in April 2013, but it granted rehearing in October 2013, reinstating the case to the docket and requesting full merits briefing. It granted the case for oral argument in June 2014.

This case reaches the Texas Supreme Court by certified question from the U.S. Fifth Circuit in New Orleans.

In this branch of the litigation arising from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion, the question is not how much is paid out but which entity will ultimately bear the cost.

BP contracted with Transocean to provide "additional insured" protection covering Transocean's operations above the water line, while BP engaged in drilling below the water line. That narrow limitation was contained in the business contracts between the entities, while the insurance contracts themselves (arguably, at least) did not mirror the same limitation.

The first major issue is about construing the various contracts. BP contends that only the insurance policy language matters in deciding whether it is an "additional insured," citing cases such as EVANSTON INSURANCE COMPANY v. ATOFINA PETROCHEMICALS, INC., No. 03-0647. The insurers contend that the extent of coverage they agreed to provide to BP was limited to the scope of Transocean's agreement to provide that coverage, and thus excludes the claims here.

The second major issue might have broader implications. BP contends that if there is any ambiguity about whether it is covered, the policy should be construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured. The insurers contend that the doctrine does not apply in this sophisticated commercial context.

In this case, the State (supported by some local governments) challenges how billboards were valued in condemnation. The landowners contend that the installed billboards are part of the realty warranting compensation for their lost income. The State argues that they should, instead, be seen as a type of personal property that can be relocated away from the property being condemned.

A mineral owner sued the operator for fraud that occurred more than four years before suit, the effects of which continued in the stream of payments to the current day. The operator responded with, among other arguments, a limitations defense. The mineral owner contended that the discovery rule should have tolled that limitations period because it reasonably relied on the operator's representations. The operator contends that any such reliance was unreasonable because Railroad Commission records contained the needed information.

The petitioners present four issues:

• Should limitations have been tolled here? In part, this asks whether the special legal duties that an operator owes to the mineral owner make the owner's reliance on these statements more reasonable.

• Did the court of appeals err in reversing and rendering judgment on the breach of contract claim? In part, this issue asks whether a defendant can obtain rendition on such a claim without having moved for summary judgment.

• Even if the statute of limitations applies, does it only bar recovery for the oldest payments made under these contracts or does limitations also bar recovery for new payments so long as the alleged misconduct was more than four years in the past?

• Was there any basis to refuse attorneys fees here given the parties' stipulations on that point?

The respondents challenge some other aspects of the judgment, including whether there was sufficient evidence that the parties agreed to a higher rate of post-judgment interest (here, 18% rather than the 5% that would have otherwise applied).

The insured suffered losses across a number of properties during Hurricane Rita. This petition concerns how to determine the insurers' maximum liability. Is it limited to the "scheduled" value of each property under the policy, taken separately? Or do other provisions in the policy allow the insured to recover the full value of those properties, staying within other limits of the policy?

The insurer contends that the policy, as a whole, should be read as a "scheduled" policy and thus construed in line with a national body of law that would limit its liability here. The petition accuses the court of appeals of coming up with what it labels a "hybrid" policy that would lead to absurd results.

The property owner contends that the court of appeals properly construed the actual policy language agreed here, and that this policy language — not a label like "scheduled" or "hybrid" policy — is what should control the outcome.

The court of appeals heard the case en banc and divided 4-3, with one of the four justices in the majority writing separately to encourage the Court to grant review.

Having recently issued an opinion about lender's rights of offset under Section 51.003 in MEHRDAD MOAYEDI v. INTERSTATE 35/CHISAM ROAD, L.P. AND MALACHI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, No. 12-0937, the Court has decided to go back for more.

This petition asks more questions about Section 51.003, including: (1) whether it creates a right to an offset when a lender resells the property on the open market rather than a foreclosure sale and (2) how to compute fair market value to compute the offset.

The City of Houston ordered the owners of a condominium to vacate until they repaired the units to meet city code. In a separate suit, the City was found to have violated the owners' due process rights. In this suit, the owners sued the City for a regulatory taking. The court of appeals agreed that the property owners had a valid claim that could proceed.

The City presents two issues:

1. Can an invalid order to vacate a condominium be a taking, even without some actual damage or use of the property in question?

2. Does the order in this case represent the kind of "public use" that constitute a taking or is it instead what the City calls "a nonpublic, noncompensatory use of a governmental entity’s police powers"?